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This thesis is part of the political science program on democratic development assistance, 
which teaches different forms of intervention and involvement with transitional democracies, 
failed states or territories temporarily placed under international supervision. The linkages to 
democratic development assistance are found in why the use of force is sanctioned, how it is 
managed, and by whom legitimate force may be employed when facing a non-state actor 
operating from the sanctuary of a failed state.  
As a serving Norwegian army officer I am schooled in the theories on military arts, including 
raison d’état and the inherent link between political objectives and military action as 
presented by Carl von Clausewitz in the work known as On War. Clausewitz himself was a 
product of the Westphalian concept of state legitimate monopoly on force, through his officer 
training and experience as a warfighter. The Military Academy (Krigsskolen) in Oslo, teaches 
the ideal of monopoly on use of force as a core function of and by the state, and that the use of 
military force should be limited to actions that supports a higher political goal. The 
authorization of, and legitimate use of force is also tied to our national values. When faced 
with the surge in piracy, Norway amended a national policy and legislation allowing for 
contracting of private armed security, and as such deviated from the until then prevailing 
norm and national policy for state monopoly on force. This change made me question the 
political leaderships’ perception of those ideals. The above observation of change in national 
legislation and practice is the motivation for the thesis at hand. Throughout my work with this 
thesis, I have been cognizant of any normative effect my officer training may have introduced 
to my understanding of the principle of the state monopoly on violence. I have therefore 
strived to minimize any potential bias that this background may have imposed upon my work 




1: Introduction  
The state monopoly on legitimate use of force may be viewed as a benchmark for democracy. 
This especially points to transparency and accountability related to the use of force. 
Transparency and accountability is for a large part sought through political oversight and 
provision of guidance and objectives for use of armed force. It is also central to public 
understanding and acceptance of the necessity of society’s use of force. Political oversight of 
why and by whom force is used has been an important mechanism in reducing and controlling 
the level of state violence.  
Democratic rule is defined as good governance, and established democracies see democratic 
rule as the only game in town.  This comprehension is why most established democracies are 
involved at some level in promoting democracy as the most suited form for governing a state. 
Democratic processes are based on checks and balances between the people and the political 
elite. Re-election and renewed trust is the only way to stay in government. An important sales 
strategy for promotion of democracy is its ability to create and maintain a safe and secure 
environment. Key to this sales strategy is the monopolization of legitimate use of force under 
the control of an elected leadership which seeks to reduce the level of violence within society. 
This is central to the social contract. When established democracies move away from the 
practice of direct (de facto) control on armed force to a legislative (de jur) control on use of 
force, authorizing commercial interests and private actors the right to bear arms and use 
armed force, a key element in the sales strategy for democracy may be seen as changing. The 
change from de facto control to de jur management and commercialization on use of force, 
allows for transition of economic power into military power.  
Approximately 80 percent of global trade is transported by sea. Sea transportation is 
channeled via some strategic chokepoints due to the placement of major ports and harbors, but 
also due to length of routes and economy of transport. A lot of trade goods have expiry date 
deadlines, so longer transit routes with lower risks is not always an option for ships 
transporting such goods. Modern day piracy or armed robbery at sea affects global economy, 
safety at sea and the security of seafarers. Contemporary piracy off the coast of Somalia 
expanded from petty theft and plundering of goods aboard transitioning ships, to major crime 
and hijacking ships with crew and goods for ransom. The change in piracy efficiency and the 
increased risk to merchant fleet operations, for both goods and personnel forced the shipping 
industry, flag states and the international community to develop policies and countermeasures. 
One of the countermeasures is the use of armed guards. Armed security may roughly be 
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divided into two main categories: government provided Vessel Protection Detachments 
(VPDs) and commercial private armed security guards or Private Military Security 
Companies (PMSCs). As an alternative to trained armed security by either VPD or PMSC, 
some ship owners opted for arming the ships` crew itself, whilst others chose to follow 
military escorts when transiting high risk areas (HRA). Countermeasure policy and regulation 
is entirely the responsibility of the flag state in terms of which of the solutions the state allows 
or provides for. Either option will provide political, legal and operational challenges for the 
flag state, the armed security operator or the ship owner and ship’s captain.  
The above understanding and the questions this raised, initiated a search to identify how the 
different European states approached the use of private armed force in the maritime 
environment. The search unveiled which of the European states that practice a strict policy 
and a strict set of regulations, and which states that practice more liberal policies, but not 
necessarily regulations on the use of private armed force in maritime environment. The result 
showed that the Netherlands and Norway were at opposite ends of the chart. Additional 
searches on merchant fleet size and sailing patterns made the foundation for this comparative 
study.  
This thesis will explore how the Netherlands and Norway decided and implemented an armed 
guard capability in response to the contemporary piracy surge.   
Thesis  
The different flag states’ acceptance and regulation of armed guards for protection of its 
merchant fleet is displayed in the below figure (Ginkel, Putten, and Molenaar 2013). The 
basis for this thesis, as depicted in the figure, is that the Netherlands and Norway as Western 
European flag states, military allies and signatory partners to the same maritime treaties and 
regulations, have very different national policies and regulations for employment of armed 
guards aboard merchant ships. The research question is therefore: which factors and leading 
arguments may explain the observed divide in policy and regulations between the two flag 




The thesis will examine theory on the state and state approaches to the principle of state 
monopoly of legitimate use of force. Subsequently, the thesis explores the national leading 
arguments or discourses, legislation and doctrine within the two flag states. The thesis will 
specifically be looking at which leading arguments that prevailed within the two flag states 
leading to two very different contemporary policies and regulatory solutions for maritime 
security.  
Scope and disposition  
The scope of this thesis is to explore and compare the basis (truths or interpretations) for state 
policy, regulation and practices on armed security at sea by two Western European states. The 
study will be limited to the period from 2007 to 2017. The time period covers the surge in 
piracy and the initial pressure placed on the flag states to develop policies and regulate 
measures aimed at protecting merchant vessels against modern piracy. The end-date for the 
time delineation is defined by the decline in the public debate, and the implementation of flag 
state (renewed) policies. Reports, records, academic works and books on contemporary piracy 
and private armed security including private military security companies (PMSCs) flourished 
at the outset of the debate across the Western world, but faded as changes to regulation and 
policies were in place, and measures materialized. The end of the time scope also coincides 
with the latest well-documented debate in the Netherlands on regulations for armed security.   
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As stated at the beginning of the outline of the scope, this thesis will only consider the use of 
force in the maritime environment as there are other international regulations applicable for 
operations in the land domain.  
Deployment of warships patrolling high risk areas (e.g. EUFOR Operation Atalanta and 
NATO Operation Ocean Shield) will be included as part of the flag state’s overall counter 
piracy strategy, but will not be covered in-depth as the focus of this thesis is on the use of 
force by embedded armed guards.   
The thesis has four chapters. Chapter 1 introduces and outlines the research problem and 
scopes the thesis. Chapter 1 will also present methodology and provided definitions for 
terminology central to the thesis. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework, including 
theory on the state and state monopoly on legitimate use of force. The chapter covers both 
history and evolution on theory on state monopoly on use of force as well as contemporary 
views and understanding of the state monopoly on use of force. The comparative study and 
analysis of the two flag stats is covered in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 summarizes and provides a 
conclusion to the findings from the analysis, and will also offer recommendations for how 
state monopoly on legitimate use of force may be managed when employed beyond the reach 
of the states’ appointed responsible institutions.  
Methodology and literature 
This thesis is a comparative case study of two subjects’ (sovereign flag states’) decision 
process for development of a policy and regulation of armed force against modern piracy  
(Andersen 2013). The methodology will be a qualitative study of available texts which will be 
subject to an analysis of discourse including leading arguments which have shaped decisions 
leading to a change in previous practice (Bratberg 2014). The analysis will also include 
process tracing. Process tracing is an analytical approach which utilizes the chronology of 
events to identify causal explanations for an observed practice internal to the case (Bratberg 
2014, 149, Collier 2011, 823). Process tracing will support in the understanding of the 
evolution of discourses. Discourses are an institutionalized way of thinking, communicating, 
receiving and acting, and can be observed in both text and in social practice. The critical 
discourse analysis seeks to unveil how texts or communications are affected through 
perception, and how that discourse further affects society at large. Perceptions or 
interpretations are the variables in the study. The communication will contain both open and 
latent meanings. In part of the study the analysis will include a breakdown of specific 
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wording. The choice of wording is important for the understanding of the social structuring 
integral to communication (Halvorsen 2008).   
Comparison of relevant variables follows the critical analysis of leading arguments, and 
encompasses the differences in perception and interpretation which have affected decisions. 
Identified factors which may unveil variables are: State history related countering acts of 
piracy, ships’ exposure to piracy and state strategy for countering piracy beyond the flag 
state’s own territorial waters, current regulation on use of armed force, and contemporary 
discourses on legitimate use of force. The analysis will apply Fairclough’s three effects to 
establish how the discourse have affected the social practice (Bratberg 2014). The critical 
discourse analysis will be used to compare knowledge and understanding of surroundings in 
relations to the prevailing norm for state monopoly on legitimate use of force in the context of 
the modern surge in piracy, social relations between the state and commercial actors, and 
identity and self-awareness related to the legitimate use of force.  
The theoretical foundation and contemporary views presented in chapter 2 will be used to 
support the analysis of the discourse. The theory will also aid in the analysis of the subjects 
interpretation of the norm for state monopoly on legitimate use of force by which the two 
states have developed its’ policy, regulations and social practice. Comparison of variables 
should support the explanation of the causes for difference in decision and social practice 
between the two subjects.  
The literature used for this study spans from academic research work by recognized scholars 
and institutes, theses and articles, government documents and legislations including 
legislative hearing notes, to journals and news chronicles. The literature and texts are mostly 
secondary sources, of which the majority is categorized as institutional sources. Primary 
sources are relatively few. Primary sources included the study encompass texts related to 
governmental documents including official responses to these (Halvorsen 2008). In addition, 
the thesis has included both states’ maritime doctrines, which communicate the state’s policy, 
ambition, de facto capability and interpretation of relating international treaties.  
The process of obtaining information revealed a distinct difference between the two states. As 
opposed to the Netherlands, where the available documentation and academic works were 
plentiful, the situation in Norway uncovered a much lower degree of academic involvement. 
Besides Østensen (2013) and Berndtsson & Østensen (2015), established Norwegian 
academics and institutions have for the most been silent. Searches for information did provide 
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some theses on Norwegian and international legal aspects on the de jur practise for use of 
force (Candidate No 588 2011, Ahnefeld 2011, Williams 2014), but only one relating to the 
socio-political implications on the private use of armed force (Klinkenberg 2013). Studies on 
relating issues are equally scares and are for the most theses from the Norwegian Staff 
College. These relate to the employment of warships against modern pirates (Johansen 2010), 
the status of PMSCs during conflict (Sandborg 2009), and outsourcing of military tasks by the 
Norwegian Armed Forces (Olsen 2008).  
The candidate was allowed access to the Royal Norwegian Navy’s seminar on Naval 
Coordination and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS). Participation at the seminar provided 
access to information not disclosed to the public, and both formal and informal dialogue with 
actors central to the change proposals in Norwegian policy and legislation. None of the verbal 
information provided through verbal dialog has been utilized without being verified through 
available literature. Except from the presentations, point papers and personal notes from the 
NCAGS seminar all the sources used are publicly available.    
A challenge faced during the information queries was that many of the literary sources at first 
glance presented similar perceptions of the prevailing norm and equal skepticism towards 
private use of force. This first impression forced a revisit of all search-string combinations in 
order to ensure that there were no confirmations-biased words included in the searches.  The 
re-visitation did not uncover any biased wording, which support the confidence in both the 
literature, and for the findings of this thesis.  
The above outline of the literature speaks to the evaluation of validity and reliability. In terms 
of validity, the literary sources that have been sought out are both general to the topic, and 
specific to the two flag states. A large number of the references used in the acquired literature 
were pursued in order to obtain more details. This urge for more and supporting data ensured 
that the initial information was validated by supplementary sources. Evaluation of reliability 
of the sources followed much the same approach. Reliability speaks to the precision and 
objectivity of the data. As the literature, or data used in this thesis are based on previous 
academic works, published material and legislative texts the level of reliability has been 
established through several of the sources’ access and use of these same primary data.        
The thesis is written in English in order include non-Norwegian readers, as both of the states 
analyzed are proficient in the English language. In addition, the majority of sources utilized 
are only available in English and any translation may serve as a filter which may alter the 
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originally communicated information. Misspellings in citations are primarily due to the 
authors’ use of United States English versus British English. Misspellings in citations have 
not been corrected.    
Definitions and codification efforts  
In order to provide a common understanding the following paragraphs will elaborate, define 
and where possible reference legal codifications of terms central to this thesis. Codification 
efforts for both pirates and private armed security guards are important for the understanding 
of any political dilemmas either of the two options imposes. In addition, Vessel Protection 
Details (VPDs) are defined in order to provide the reader with an understanding of VPDs as a 
capability. Private armed security and VPDs are equally complicating as the various port 
states, flag states and coastal states all have a responsibility in regulating the use of armed 
force, and all have varying approaches to state monopoly on legitimate use of force.  
Definition and codification efforts on piracy 
Piracy is defined as any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends against a ship or against persons or property on board ships on the 
high seas outside the jurisdiction of any state. This definition is a compilation of the piracy 
definition provided in Article 101(a) of UNCLOS (UN 1973, 60). Piracy has since its 
appearance presented a political and international challenge due to the intricate difficulties of 
national, international or coastal state jurisdiction (Campbell et al. 2010, 207, Geiß and Petrig 
2011, 4). A key reason for why piracy is viewed as more severe than similar acts on land, is 
the vulnerable state of the victims, which are confined aboard a vessel, surrounded by an 
environment in which mankind has limited ability for flight and survival. Piracy is also 
viewed as one of the foundational threats that shaped the development of European navies in 
the 17
th
 century (Sjøforsvarsstaben 2015, 27). The threat of piracy attacks impacts the 
unilaterally agreed freedom of navigation and as such impacts functions of society far beyond 
the direct victim. This impact has prompted that any state can prosecute and punish any actors 
involved in piracy (Kelly 2014, 27-28).  
The contemporary understanding of piracy and the impact it has on society is a continuous 
process. Piracy was viewed as a problem of the past without relevance to modern treaties. 
Efforts to establish sufficient means to effectively prosecute and thereby suppress modern 
piracy was hampered by a shortcoming in the understanding of piracy as a threat to society, 
and by opposing national interests by some of the states affected by the phenomena  (Geiß 
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and Petrig 2011, 52). Piracy as observed in the 21
st
 century have made an international 
impact, but is for the most confined to some specific areas in the Indian Ocean, specifically 
the Gulf of Aden and the Somali basin, the Gulf of Guinea outside West Africa, the South 
China Sea, and the Strait of Malacca (Marley 2011, 40-43, Murphy 2010, 93). In the Gulf of 
Aden, piracy developed from around 1995 when armed local fishermen boarded foreign 
fishery vessels claiming financial compensation or unauthorized tax (Campbell et al. 2010, 
211, Marley 2011, 56-60). Piracy in its modern form has well organized structures, consisting 
of leadership functions, intelligence network, logistics, armed action groups and ransom 
brokers. Acts of piracy are organized and executed from both shore and larger vessels. Larger 
vessels providing longer operational reach and endurance at sea as the larger vessels function 
as floating operating bases from which smaller boats are launched. Pirated ships are moved 
and anchored in territorial waters of non-functional states, whereby both ship and crew are 
guarded until a settlement has been made (Geiß and Petrig 2011, 10-12, Campbell et al. 2010, 
212).   
“Throughout the 20
th
 century, codification efforts relating to piracy were largely 
determined by the perception that piracy amounts to an historical phenomenon hardly in need 
of elaborate codification, rather than an imminent problem of the modern world. To some 
extent, piracy was not even perceived as being worthy of any specific codification at all and, 
accordingly, the rules that ultimately found their way into UNCLOS’ piracy regime, were 
never the subject of any in-depth discussions. For the most part, the rules relating to piracy 
were simply imported from previous draft conventions or earlier treaties, with all their 
intricacies and loopholes.” (Geiß and Petrig 2011, 51,52)  
The lack of appropriate codification of piracy, beyond that which was inherited from earlier 
drafts of UNCLOS, makes it hard to develop a coherent and effective international counter 
strategy.   
Definition and codification efforts on private armed security  
Private armed security guards are defined as “Private contractors employed to provide 
Security Personnel, both armed and unarmed, on board for protection against piracy.” (IMO 
2011a, Annex page 1). The International Maritime Organization (IMO) uses the word 
maritime instead of military in its definition of PMSCs. Armed security operations in general 
require a certain degree of security related proficiency, and often beyond the level of policing 
tasks, therefore the word military is likely more descriptive. The International Committee of 
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the Red Cross (ICRC) uses a more elaborate definition, where PMSCs are categorized as 
commercial businesses that provide military or security services (ICRC 2008, 9).  
There is not sufficient granularity in the above definitions to understand the full range of 
differences in private armed security. Non-state or private armed security guards are defined 
as personnel bearing arms to protect life, ship and goods, but are not part of the state’s 
organized monopoly on violence. This definition covers the range from ad hoc armed 
merchant sailors with very limited or no training, in the lawful use of firearms, to a team of 
private armed security guards. Arming of individual sailors and ship crews, who are laymen 
in the use of armed force, is the lowest level for armed security for countering acts of piracy. 
The level of training among private armed guards, range from some training and up to 
proficiency acquired through years of military experience. Protection of merchant ships in 
pirate infested areas have employed or utilized armed security spanning this entire range. The 
definition of PMSCs provided by ICRC covers most of the alternatives for hired embedded 
security. Private Military Security Companies (PMSC) is the term that will be used 
throughout this thesis when there describing private armed security in the corporate form, 
whereas private armed guard or private armed security guard will be the term used for 
describing the phenomenon, concept or function.  
The status for codification of private armed guards is in no better shape than that of piracy. 
The codification of private armed security is often blurred by misconceptions of what private 
armed security is, together with biased historic images of mercenaries. Fortunately, there are 
protocols which can support the codification, but even these require interpretation.  
The Maritime Security Committee (MSC) of the IMO was equally in need of a definition and 
regulation for embarked private armed security guards, which manifested itself with a 
guidance for ship owners, -operators and -masters (IMO 2011a) and a recommendations for 
flag states on the use of privately contracted armed security personnel (IMO 2011b). The IMO 
documents provide clear requirements for the employment of embedded private armed 
security (Pitney Jr. and Levin 2014, 38). IMO is careful to not dictate the employment of 
embarked armed security as the solution and remarks that the employment of security 
measures remains at the digression of the flag state and the constraints of national law. IMO 
did not provide a codification of private armed security guards, but declared that capability 
needed to be regulated under the flag state’s domestic law.  
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In order to move beyond the misconception that private armed security, contracted with the 
protection of merchant ships, are mercenaries, elimination of that option should serve as a 
starting point. Protocol I of the Geneva conventions identifies two criteria which define a 
mercenary. The same two criteria are included in the set of criteria which are used to define a 
mercenary contained within the UN Mercenary Convention which entered into force in 2001. 
Provided private armed security guards are limited to protective duties, they do not fall under 
the definition for mercenaries (Pitney Jr. and Levin 2014, 96). The above conclusion 
coincides with analysis done in other studies. A 2009 study into the legal status of private 
military security companies (PMSCs) who provide security during operations in the land 
domain concluded that armed security guards were operating in a legal grey zone, and should 
be codified as unprivileged belligerents leaving them without the privileges specific for 
combatants (Sandborg 2009, 4). The study was specific to armed security guards on land, and 
did not consider the legal status of armed security at sea.  
The absence of a definite codification of private armed security guards made the Venice 
Commission initiate a study to problem. The Venice Commission is the Council of Europe's 
advisory body on constitutional matters, and is tasked to provide legal advice in support of 
member nations (2014). The Venice Commission did not reach an agreement on the status of 
private armed security guards, and chose instead to reference the Montreux Document, which 
will covered in-depth under contemporary approaches to use of force, reaffirmed the 
international obligations of states in relation to employment of private armed guards 
(Cameron 2009, 5, 19). Another study, which also discarded the mercenary codification since 
private armed guards cannot be held 
accountable in accordance with the Geneva 
Conventions, concluded that armed security 
guards should be codified as civilians, 
which is in line with the recommendations 
in the Montreux Document (ICRC 2008, 
14-15). Codifying private armed guards as 
civilians will leave them subject to normal 
criminal investigation (Østensen 2014, 19). 
Until there is a concluding codification 
effort, private armed security guards should 
be treated as civilians.    
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The Montreux Document has so far provided the best clarification of private armed security 
guards’ legal status. A lack of transparency in the employment and use of force of private 
armed security contractors has been core to often voiced caution against the industry in many 
studies on the subject.  Building on the Montreux Document the private security community 
itself produced the  International Code of Conduct (ICoC), which will be covered in-depth 
later, is a branch standard for private armed security actors (ICoCA 2010). The provision of a 
state supported branch standard also helped in distancing the security industry from being 
tagged as mercenaries.  
Definition of military vessel protection detail  
The Royal Netherlands Navy defines VPDs as military armed supplements to other protective 
measures for civilian ships. The Dutch definition details a very defensive posture for VPD 
operations  (Royal Netherlands Navy 2014, 347). 
“VPDs are unique in the maritime security paradigm, as they introduce military 
personnel, equipment, and activities—including military-specific command and control 
hierarchies—directly into the commercial maritime sector, aboard private vessels. This 
infuses sovereign state military operations into commercial activities.” (Oceans Beyond 
Piracy 2017, 1) 
Descriptions of VPDs encountered in the literature do not specify the nationality of VPD in 
relation to flag state or ship registry. There are records of VPDs supplied by states other than 
the judicial flag state of which the use of force has been controversial (Oceans Beyond Piracy 
2017, 1). One of the controversies was related to absence of regulations for third party use of 
force operated and delivered from aboard a Norwegian registered ship (Prestegård 2013). For 
the purpose of this thesis it will be assumed that VPDs are provided by the flag state in which 
the ship is registered. Vessel Protection Details (VPD) as defined is an embedded armed unit 
derived from the flag states military force. 
There is no specific codification for vessel protection details (VPDs) as these are regular 
combatants and therefore are protected under the Geneva Conventions. As regular 
combatants, the use of force will be subject to interstate agreements which offer a different 




2: State monopoly on legitimate use of force 
This chapter will set the theoretical foundation, and will serve the purpose of identifying both 
the prevailing historical norm and some theoretical perspectives on the evolution of the state 
and the state monopoly on legitimate use of force. The chapter will end off with a short 
introduction to contemporary best management practice for the employment of armed force 
for countering acts of piracy. 
Establishing a legitimate monopoly on the use of force 
The origins of the concept of state sovereignty can be traced back to the treaty of Westphalia 
in 1648. (Kissinger 2014, 25-26). The principle or norm that states should have a monopoly 
on legitimate use of force has evolved over time, starting with the Treaty of Westphalia. 
Among the concepts that were conceived in or after Westphalia was the way of organizing the 
diversity of socio-political regimes into states and regulating the use of force between these 
entities. On the regulation on the use of force, the Treaty of Westphalia limited the legitimate 
right to stand up an army to that of the state. The treaty aimed for the cessation of private 
military entrepreneurs as independent actors, and sought to ensure that the state took 
command of the use of armed force, by claiming all private armies as unlawful (Høiback 
2014, 67). The intent behind the treaty has been identified as a wish to avoid the shed of blood 
through regulating the right to mount armed force over disputes. The intent captured within 
the treaty has laid the foundation for concepts that still apply (Avalon 2008). The 
establishment of standing armies forced the development of permanent infrastructure which 
led to a new set of dynamics leading up to the modern administration and fiscal constructs 
(Høiback 2014, 67). The abolishment of private armies, and the establishment of standing 
militaries as a function, both challenged and solved issues related to the king’s dilemma. The 
king’s dilemma is the balance of maintaining a standing military force, at the ready and in 
large numbers in the absence of an imminent threat (Smith 2005, 20). The new challenge was 
the financing of such a large standing force, whilst the former issue of loyalty to a large extent 
was solved. The monopoly on legitimate use of force as prescribed in the treaty is an early 
version of how the concept is understood in the modern sense.  
The understating of state as a construct has changed over time, from being geographically 
focused to becoming a geographical and functional based entity. Functions of the state 
include certain responsibilities to which the governing regime will be held accountable both 
internally and externally. A widely used understanding of state is the ideas presented by Max 
Weber, which encompassed the existence of an administrative apparatus with a successful 
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claim to monopoly on legitimate use of force within its territorial boarders (Weiss 2012, 17, 
Ghani and Lockhart 2008, 116). State in the modern sense is based on Max Weber’s theory on 
the power of imposing one actor’s will on another, supplemented by Hobbes’ social contract 
theory. Hobbes’ social contract entails the power of collective cooperation towards a common 
goal, where the governing body’s legitimacy is based on consent by subjects of the state 
(Ghani and Lockhart 2008, 116-117). Thomas Hobbes’ ideals were presented in the book The 
Leviathan through the assumption that conflict was best resolved, and could only occur if 
subjects of the state were prohibited from using force in pursuit of individual interests. 
Hobbes’ ideas of individual subordination to central authority have influenced the origins of 
the modern norm on state monopoly on violence (Krahmann 2009, 2). Hobbes’ view on 
man’s nature was thus opposed by Rousseau  and Locke  (Fukuyama 2012, 26-28) who 
offered less violent views on the nature of man. Locke argued for man’s rights, whilst 
Rousseau argued that man was more disposed to flight rather than fight in the presence of 
imminent violence, and as such claimed that the outset of man was more peacefully oriented. 
He state was also defined through its legitimate monopoly to claim taxes within its territory, 
as presented by Joseph Schumpeter (Løkke 2018). Taxation has historically been key to the 
state’s ability to provide security and funding of military campaigns (Fukuyama 2012, 113). 
The legitimacy provided to the governing body by the governed is, and was never static. 
Legitimacy is monitored, reaffirmed and challenged through the electoral processes. This 
include policy and the legislative approach to monopolization of rights held by the state which 
by no means are set (Ghani and Lockhart 2008, 117-118). 
State monopoly on legitimate use of force should be viewed against the following aspects in 
order to be recognized as legitimate in the sense provided in the theoretical norm:  
 “Firstly, it determines who is permitted to use force, namely the democratic state and 
its agencies. Second, it involves an agreement on what is considered the legitimate use of 
violence and on what basis, such as outlawing of torture and the proportionality of force. 
Finally, the definition proscribes under which circumstances and for what purposes state 
actors may employ force, including public security and national defence. The issue of who is 
permitted to use force is of central importance. ” (Krahmann 2009, 2) 
Other concepts that originate from the conferences in Westphalia are raison d’état and 
national interest. These two concepts were intended to rationalise and limit the use of force 
(Kissinger 2014, 30). Raison d’état and national interest should both be viewed as 
supplements to the states’ claim  to legitimate use of force, as both concepts provide some 
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form of predictability of the conditions that are likely to trigger the use of force. The use of 
force is legitimate when executed as a function of the state, is directed to fulfil a national 
political objective and executed in a manner not challenging to universal human rights. This 
presumption is recognizable within the two concepts, hence force should be utilized for 
specific purposes and only in the interest of the state. Raison d’état refers to that structure of 
the state which purpose is to employ legitimate force on behalf of the state in order secure the 
states interests. The concept of national interest must be understood and adapted to situations 
where the state or its proxies employ force beyond the jurisdiction of the state’s own territory 
(Kissinger 2014, 3).  
The following paragraphs will cover the early implementation and proliferation of the 
concepts for state, and state legitimate monopoly on use of force beyond the European 
continent.  
From a European order to a world order 
In the era of European expansion and colonialism, states and government institutions in 
Europe were established in accordance with the early interpretations of the Treaty of 
Westphalia. The Westphalian principles are a core foundation for the existing world order. 
The Westphalian principles were spread and literally missioned outside the European 
continent, as the European influence spread. 
“The Westphalian system spread around the world as the framework for a state-based 
international order spanning multiple civilizations and regions because, as the European 
nations expanded, they carried the blueprint of their international order with them.” 
(Kissinger 2014, 6) 
The blueprint referred to also incorporated the state’s monopolization of legitimate use of 
force (Høiback 2014, 293).  
From the initial period of expansion into new territories and to the return to self-rule for 
colonized countries in the 20
th
 century, there was fluctuation in the level of state approach 
monopoly on legitimate use of armed force. Some of the major commercial entrepreneurs, 
who pioneered and funded the explorations into new territories, stood up their own private 
armies for protective purposes. The need for enhanced security arose as private and 
commercial adventures challenged local governance, and indigenous peoples’ way of life. 
Enhanced security measures undertaken by private armies were also in part due to the 
European states’ approach of limiting state regulations to the use of force to within its 
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European territories, and for state’s own armed forces (Pitney Jr. and Levin 2014, ix, 8, 107). 
The states’ limited regulation on the use of force beyond the European continent parred with 
the lack of available military capability made the rise and use of private armies acceptable up 
to a certain degree (Britannica).   
In more recent times, the Charter of the United Nations, or UN Charter affirms the state as the 
only legal entity in the supranational or global context (UN 1945, 3). The UN Charter as such 
reaffirms the evolved concept and definition of state as first addressed in the Treaty of 
Westphalia. The UN does so by proclaiming that the state is the only sovereign entity. The 
UN Charter repeats that a key function of the state is the provision of peace and security: 
hence the state should monopolize the use of force within its sovereign territory, and serve as 
the legal and accountable provider of legitimate force in matters of interstate dealings. This 
responsibility is essential to the social contract between the state and its subjects. Subjects of 
the state encompass own citizens, and those who temporarily resides within the state’s 
sovereign territory. An important tool related to the keeping of peace and maintaining the 
collective security, is the existence of a common understanding of why and how force may be 
applied under different conditions. There is a distinct difference in the use of force internally 
and externally. Most states communicate the distinction on use of force internally and 
externally through law and specific jurisdiction and responsibility of the enforcing agencies. 
Legitimate use of force within the sovereign territory is governed by internal policies, while 
legitimate use of force against external threats are legitimized externally (Leander 2004, 9).  
As identified in the above paragraphs, the consensus of the state as the sovereign entity in 
interstate dealings has been proliferated and evolved over time. The state’s legitimate 
monopoly on the use of force has been equally proliferated, interpreted, evolved and 
implemented to the point of global acknowledgement. The next paragraphs will elaborate on 
the ideal followed by contemporary views on the states legitimate use of force.  
Regulating the use of force – The norm 
The ability to rule is inherently linked to the capability of exercising command and control, 
and to employ violence purposefully, both internally and externally. The link between ruler 
and the security apparatus exists in order to claim and maintain sovereign rights, impose a 
rule of law, and protect the state, including its resources and subjects (Smith 2005, 10-12). 
Throughout history rulers have financed a security apparatus, sometimes through the 
contracting of a mercenary force. A challenge associated with employing a mercenary force is 
loyalty, which essentially is linked to payment (or the right to plunder) in exchange for the 
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services provided. As presented earlier, the Treaty of Westphalia sought to outlaw mercenary 
armies, and over time the nation states replaced mercenaries with conscripted citizen armies 
or in some instances professional armies (Smith 2005, 30, Kissinger 2014, 46-47, Høiback 
2014, 67, Bailes, Schneckener, and Wulf 2007, 21). The private use of force should be seen as 
a challenge the sustainable political solution to any conflict, and to the state’s claim to 
legitimate use of force (Jarstad and Sisk 2008, Chapter 5).  
Being part of a state’s military force is a profession and not an occupation. The difference is 
that a profession requires special knowledge and set of skills to exercise a specific function of 
society. A profession is further recognizable through expertise, responsibility, unity and 
identity (Brunborg 2008). Members of the state’s military are also required to be loyal. The 
state’s demand for loyalty from its military professionals provides the group and individual 
with a special social status. That status comes at the cost of individual rights like for instance 
the freedom of speech (Klemet 2016). 
“The restrictive interpretation of what role of private actors should play in owning 





 Centuries to become dominant only in the 20
th
.” (Leander 2004, 13) Starting in the 1640s 
and with a shift in pace in the 18
th
 Century, the move towards state owned conscripted or 
professional armies provided several benefits. Its basis was the need for a loyal force in high 
volume which shared a common goal with the ruling elite and citizens of the state. These 
requirements also strengthened the social contract, as the subjects give up the right to use 
force for private ends and pay tax in exchange for the ruler’s provision of security, both 
internally and externally (Smith 2005, 7-12). Just as state monopoly on legitimate use of force 
became dominant in 20
th
 Century, it was observed that the level of monopoly reached“…its 
peak in the 1960s.” (Krahmann 2009, 15). The choice of words implies that the application of 
monopoly on legitimate use of force either stalled at the 1960s-level, or diminished thereafter.  
The link between the state and the employment of force also serve a more practical, than 
moral function, as identified in the works by Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz was a Prussian 
officer who served in a military culture developed on the very principles of the Westphalian 
treaties. Clausewitz has been viewed as a pioneer in bridging military means and actions with 
political goals and objectives. The bridging of the two ensured the prioritized and appropriate 
strategic effects for use of force. Carl von Clausewitz identified the Treaty of Westphalia as a 
turning point (Clausewitz 1993, 394). The turning point occurred as states started to organize 
and monopolize the use of force, whilst abolishing the practice of private armies. “War is 
21 
 
merely the continuation of policy by other means” (Clausewitz 1993, 99) is often cited in 
order to explain the relationship between politics and the utilization of military force. That 
statement is often used in an expanded or extrapolated version to define or justify the use of 
military force beyond interstate conflicts, which was the focus of Clausewitz’s theories.  
Summarizing the theoretical ideals presented above, it seems clear that state monopoly on 
legitimate use of force was never fully implemented in line with the original treaties and 
views. The original intent, views and theories are however still a guiding norm and general 
direction contained within international charters (Krahmann 2009, 23). There has been 
fluctuation and development in the practice of state monopoly on violence throughout history. 
The development of view interpretation and practice will continue, as will be elaborated in the 
following paragraphs.  
Regulating the use of force – Contemporary perspectives 
As identified above, the implementation and application of the norm for monopoly on 
legitimate use of force has fluctuated over time. Contemporary perspectives on use of force 
are shaped by the prevailing interpretation of the norm and the level of adaptation of those 
same norms or ideals. There are two main directions for management of the monopoly on use 
force - de jur versus de facto. On deciding between the two directions, the state’s approach 
does not need to be an absolute (Weiss 2012, 17). The implication of accepting Clausewitz’s 
view, that the use of force is limited to be a continuation of politics implies that only political 
goals and state authorities are entitled to authorize the use of force to resolve a conflict of 
interest. The linkage of force and politics, where force supplies the means to reach political 
goals, requires the inherent capability to both control and direct the use of force to that end. 
Controlling and directing use of force has to be understood in parallel with the two main 
directions for monopolizing use of force. The following may support the understanding of the 
difference between controlling and directing the use of force. Controlling is a passive 
approach and entails provision of a framework (e.g. law) and if needed investigating wrongful 
employment of force reactively. Whereas directing is an active approach and requires a 
capability for political insight and authorization of force through the provision of goals, 
objectives, and a clearly defined purpose or desired end-state (e.g. issue rules of engagement, 
validate and approve targets, or restrict the use of force through provision of caveats (Egeberg 
2017, 60)). This implication correlates with Krahmann’s earlier presented perspective on the 
aspects required to legitimatize the use of force. A central aspect for employing force is 
related to the state’s purpose for choosing to resort to use of force (Krahmann 2009, 2). 
22 
 
Contemporary studies have questioned what the word monopoly entails. What capacity is 
contained within the word monopoly, is it a strict de facto approach or is it a de jur capability 
(Leander 2004, 13). Does the norm prescribe the need to direct force, or is controlling force 
sufficient. The identified ambiguity related to the concept of monopoly is as much a product 
of an increasingly globalized world. The nature of globalization across the sovereignty claims 
of the state in general, has become a driving factor in the transformation of the state’s claim to 
monopoly on legitimate use of violence. Legitimate use of force is increasingly becoming an 
international or intergovernmental regulation, and is increasingly including the private sector 
in the evolution of regulations on legitimate use of force (Leander 2004, 2-3). Krahman’s 
observation and analysis of when in time the state’s claim to monopoly on legitimate use of 
force peaked, merged with the challenging nature of globalism, and the increasing authority or 
leverage held by the security industry, is moving towards a redefinition for the norm on 
monopoly on legitimate use of force.   
The contemporary view that state monopoly on use of force is under pressure or even broken, 
is amplified through different initiatives on self-regulation of and by the security industry  
(Klinkenberg 2013). Two of the prominent initiatives are the Montreux Document and the 
International Code of Conduct (ICoC). The Montreux Document was the first work which 
reaffirmed legal obligations held by the state in regulating private military security companies 
(PMSCs). The work related to the Montreux Document was established at the initiative of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Swiss government, and was 
initially joined by 17 nations (ICRC 2008). As of late 2019, there were 56 signatory nations. 
While the Montreux Document provided guidance for states, the International Code of 
Conduct (ICoC) provided a branch standard for the security industry. The ICoC was produced 
in 2010, at the initiative of the industry itself with support from the Swiss government. The 
intent with ICoC is to ensure respect for human rights and international humanitarian law. 
ICoC have incorporated two distinct branch oversight mechanisms. Firstly a company self-
assessment, and secondly a centralized evaluation and complaints function (ICoCA 2010). 
ICoC as a standard aims at regulating the security industry, which also has the effect of 
minimizing the states’ regulatory role (Østensen 2013, 5).  
Contemporary studies and articles on changes in the security environment offer alternative 
views and interpretations which redefine the states monopoly on legitimate use of force. 
Leading arguments have focused on the regulatory role – or tried to (re)define the state’s 
responsibilities. De jur and de facto as presented earlier, constitute two very generic directions 
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for state management of the legitimate use of force, and other contemporaries have presented 
more nuanced alternatives. A Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
(DCAF) study provided a more in-depth view on how the state could uphold its claim to 
monopoly on legitimate use of force which also included private PSMCs. The alternative 
models range from full monopolization (state control and ownership) to an open market (state 
regulation) approach. The most extreme model included the private security industry as an 
equal partner in the development of armed security regulation mechanisms. Inclusion of 
PMSCs would be through consultation, dialogue and cooperation. The study underlined that 
the models did not include civil society, an important stakeholder in the transformation of 
legitimate use of force. The social contract as such was not considered, which arguably 
presents a challenge for such an open market alternative (Bailes, Schneckener, and Wulf 
2007, 6-9). The study concluded that the open market approach would be feasible due to the 
availability of retired military personnel. The study, however cautioned that the open marked 
model would turn economic power into military power much quicker than earlier in history 
(Bailes, Schneckener, and Wulf 2007, 19). Contemporary changes in regards to the norm are 
as much a choice of governments, as it is an external challenge of the norm for monopoly by 
private security actors (Bailes, Schneckener, and Wulf 2007, 1).  
Many of the above observations are shared by other contemporaries. What differentiates the 
contemporary studies are the analysis of why, and the degree of impact contemporary trends 
will bring on the existing norm. Earlier it has been stated that state monopoly on legitimate 
use of force peaked halfway into the 20
th
 Century, which also indicated a decline thereafter. 
From that peak in state monopoly of force, most Western states have witnessed and accepted 
a shift in power on the employment of force, whilst others have actively pursued and 
supported this shift (Krahmann 2009, 26). Not all studies related to the potential shift in the 
norm are in agreement whether or not the new norm for legitimate use of force will seek to 
empower the private security industry at the cost of the state. Anna Leander’s research offered 
a less absolute outcome of the potential shift to the norm. The research references other 
sectors where former state ownership was transformed into a regulated business model. In 
these other sector transformations, the state assumed the role as contracting business partner, 
and transferred the role of service provider to commercial actors. Such sector reform is not a 
challenge to the default monopoly on legitimate use of force, it is a transformation of the 
state’s function which will not end state control on the use of force (Leander 2004, 8 and 16). 
A sector reform where the state only retains the policy and legislative capability in relations to 
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monopoly on legitimate use of force, and outsources the functions of enforcing agencies, will 
most likely only work within consolidated states (Bailes, Schneckener, and Wulf 2007, 6, 
Krahmann 2009, 27-28)  
A change in norm, policy, legislation and practice does not appear in and by itself. A change 
requires acceptance and approval provided through the social contract. In the study by DCAF, 
civil society’s view on a change in the norm was not included, but other studies have looked 
at civil society’s view on a shift in the norm (Krahmann 2009). A 2009 study into the influx 
of the private armed security industry in the United States and the United Kingdom provided 
two distinct observations. The first observation was that the state monopoly on legitimate use 
of force was declining and that the abolishment of armed private security was never 
completed. The second observation was a shift in acceptance for private armed security, 
paralleled by the publics’ fading view on the police. The shift in public acceptance was partly 
due to increased open presence of private armed security personnel along with less visible 
police presence. The shift was boosted by a reduction in military spending and structure, 
whilst the public perceived need for security was increasing. According to the study, 
reductions in the militaries have provided the armed security industry with a solid and 
qualified mass for recruitment (Krahmann 2009, 15-16). 
It is clear that there is pressure on the norm for state monopoly on legitimate use of force that 
has prevailed for centuries. However contemporary scholars are not in agreement as to 
whether the pressure is a challenge to the concept of state monopoly or merely a change to the 
management model of that monopoly. Real world politics may be somewhere between a de 
jur and a de facto approach, as the political solution is often driven by economy, available 
capacity and geopolitical interest. The contemporary perspectives may serve as guidance to 
the analysis of how Norway and the Netherlands may have interpreted state monopoly on 
legitimate use of force when shaping the respective policies and legislation on the use of 
armed security onboard merchant ships. As those interpretations are manifested in legal 
approaches, the following paragraphs will elaborate on international regulations specific for 
the maritime environment.  
Regulations in the maritime environment 
This part will provide an overview of relevant regulations for the maritime environment, 
ranging from the overall agreements for freedom on the high seas, to the specific 
intergovernmental steps to uphold the unilaterally expected freedom of navigation in the face 
of modern piracy. Studying international treaties, laws and regulations pertaining to travel at 
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sea makes it evident that there are three main areas relevant to this thesis. Firstly, treaties 
covering the right to innocent passage at sea Secondly, treaties covering acts of piracy. And 
thirdly, treaties on countering the piracy threat by force. Treaties for passage at sea have 
limited direct impact on the focus of this thesis beyond that of identifying the complexity 
related to involved authorities sovereign rights and obligations. Authorities with real or 
functional jurisdiction are obligated to suppress acts of piracy, and have the right to regulate 
different actors, including private armed guards’ actions during passage. 
The most recent Dutch maritime doctrine offers an historic description of the initial ideas that 
still govern the law of the sea which can be traced back to 1609 (Royal Netherlands Navy 
2014, 41). The initial ideas on how the maritime environment should be sectioned between 
national and international jurisdiction, still affect the choice of route for travel and the 
obligations to suppress unlawful acts. Maritime passage involves a myriad of directly or 
indirectly involved authorities, all of who carry a degree of responsibility, obligations and 
jurisdiction. Involved authorities span from the flag state, via all encountered harbor 
authorities and coastal states with either real jurisdiction or functional jurisdiction of the water 
body.  The below figure depicts the geographically delineated regulatory complexity for sea 
(and air) passage (Royal Netherlands Navy 2014, 43). Each geographical zone has its specific 
legal status, integrity and jurisdiction. This includes the right and obligation to legitimately 
enforce the law by means of armed response. The figure does not cover the functional 
jurisdiction of the flag state, the ship owner or the shipmaster operating in the different zones. 
The obligations of the ship owner, shipmaster and the flag state in relation to the employment 
of armed guards at sea, will be covered in the below paragraph on best management practice, 




High risk area 
In addition to the historically defined judicial zones of the sea, there are areas of increased 
risk which are tagged as a high risk area (HRA). HRA is a geographically specified area in 
which increased risk of violence to ship, goods or crew may be encountered.    
High risk areas are assessed and geographically specified by the International Maritime 
Organization’s (IMO) and published through the Best Management Practice (BMP) on safety 
at sea, or by separate evaluation by the flag state (IMO 2011a, Annex page 1). HRA is also 
defined as “A geographical area of higher or specific risk to merchant ships.” (NATO 2006, 
2-1).  
The definitions for HRA do not specify or limit the threat to piracy alone, but covers all types 
of threats from robbery at sea to interstate armed conflict and war.  
Contemporary best management practice 
As presented in the above paragraphs, the IMO and related work provides the contemporary 
best management practice on safety at sea. Use of force in the maritime environment is the 
fine balance of sovereign rights and obligations, a vacuum of enforcement and investigative 
capability, and the vulnerability of passage in potentially high risk or hostile waters. The lack 
of unity of interest in codifying modern acts of piracy and private armed security guards 
ensures continued lack of a coherent global strategy to both phenomena. Only the pirates 
benefit for the lack of a coherent contemporary strategy. Given the summarized challenges, 
the international community in general and flag states especially are left with few options 
other than promoting the contemporary BMP for endorsement by affected port and costal 
states, hoping this will provide sufficient legal coverage for private armed security guards 
aboard the merchant fleet.     
Summary of the theory on state’s monopoly of legitimate use of 
force and regulations in the maritime environment 
Chapter 2 has focused on the theoretical foundation and evolution of the prevailing norm for 
state and state monopoly on legitimate use of force, including supporting concepts. The norm 
for the state’s claim on legitimate use of force peaked halfway through the 20
th
 Century, 
whereby the norm thereafter was placed under pressure, partly by the security industry, and in 
part at some states’ own choice. Contemporary research of any potential impact the 
recognized pressure has brought on, and will continue to bring onto the states monopoly on 
legitimate use of force, mostly follow the same extrapolated direction. The extrapolated 
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direction starts at the recognized peak and looks to explain the change or decline in monopoly 
on use of force. The differences in opinion, among contemporary scholars relates to whether 
or not the monopoly will cease to be the norm versus remain as a norm with a transformed 
management model. The latter part of the chapter focused on regulations for use of armed 
security in the maritime environment, including best management practices. The theoretical 
foundation presented will support in the analysis of the chosen approaches in the case study in 
the following chapter.      
3: Analysis of how two Western European states ended up 
with different solutions for protecting merchant vessels 
against Piracy 
This chapter will firstly review relevant history and experiences for the two flag states, before 
looking at policy for of state monopoly on legitimate use of force. The chapter will also 
provide a metric comparison of merchant fleet potential exposure to acts of piracy, and a 
metric comparison of relevant military capabilities from 2011 when both states’ were in 
search of an armed security option. In the two last parts of the chapter, the two states’ 
regulations for armed security will be outlined, and lastly, the discourses that shaped 
contemporary decisions will be presented and analyzed.   
History and historic experiences related to employment of armed 
private security  
Awareness of the state’s collective history and historic experiences on the use of force as a 
means to mitigate specific threats will likely inform, affect and shape contemporary 
perceptions, decisions and policy on comparable matters in the future. Historic experiences of 
a negative nature will sometimes affect future decisions without considering the evolution of 
either threat, or means of force to counter the specific threat. Norway and the Netherlands are 
comparable in many aspects, but have very different histories and experiences in relation to 
the use of force externally. The following paragraphs on history and historic experiences is 
limited to two states’ history on merchant fleet exposure to piracy, and state experience in 
fighting piracy and protecting national interests beyond the confines of own territorial waters. 
Relevant experiences date back to the 17
th
 century, just prior to the conferences in Westphalia.  
Norway became a sovereign state in 1905 when independence from Sweden was negotiated. 
Prior to its independence in 1905, Norway was a puppet state subordinate to the rule of either 
28 
 
Danish or Swedish monarchs. Norwegian subordination to neighboring states’ goes  back to 
the 14
th
 century (Orning 2015). In the early 17
th
 century, including during the Westphalian 
conferences, Norway was subordinate to Danish rule. Consequentially, the Kingdom of 
Norway was not an independent political or militarily entity with sovereign participation in 
early development of a state norm and of state monopoly on use of force. In the post-
Westphalian era it was the Danish envoy and acting head of state, Hannibal Sehested who 
imposed the transition of the Norwegian army. By 1660 Sehested had replaced the Norwegian 
private contracted armies with a state controlled conscription army in line with the new norm 
for state monopolization of legitimate use of force (Hjardar et al. 2016, 178-216). As a puppet 
state Norway had very limited rights to establish and employ an independent foreign policy. 
The restrictions imposed during the Danish rule endured until October 1905, several months 
after independence was granted (Utenriksdepartementet 2015b). A result of the restrictions for 
an independent foreign political engagement is the lack of direct linkage and history with 
proceeds and treaties developed prior to 1905. Norway as an independent state and political 
entity has not been forced to deal with neither pirates nor the employment of private armed 
guards at the legislative level until the surge in modern piracy in the 21
st
 century.   
Historic accounts on countering piracy, records that Norwegian warships were dispatched to 
counter piracy in support of the merchant fleet as early as 1828 (Sjøforsvarsstaben 2015, 27) 
(Hjardar et al. 2016, 515). In more recent history, the state of Norway has on several 
occasions responded to the international call for employment of military force against modern 
pirates. The Norwegian navy, air force and Special Forces have all contributed with force 
elements in EU’s Operation Atalanta and NATO’s Operation Oscan Shield. Operations 
mandated to prevent or target acts of piracy off the Horn of Africa.  
Norway has also employed a Vessel 
Protection Detail (VDP) capability 
aboard a merchant ship. During 
Operation RECSYR, which was the 
multinational effort to remove 
chemical weapons and chemical 
agents from the Syrian regime, a 
mixed team drafted from the 




and the Norwegian Navy EOD Command (Minedykkerkommandoen) was employed as an 
embedded military security detachment aboard M/V “Taiko”
1
 (Brendefur Unknown year). 
However there is a distinction between a VPD as defined earlier in this thesis and the VPD 
aboard M/V “Taiko”.  M/V “Taiko” was commissioned by the Norwegian government as a 
cargo ship for chemical weapons and agents. As a commissioned and temporarily military 
commanded vessel, M/V “Taiko” was provided with enhanced security measures while 
operating in Syrian territorial waters. The enhanced security measures included a naval 
shipmaster (captain), a VPD and an escorting Norwegian navy warship (Ege 2015, Brendefur 
Unknown year). The temporarily commissioning and embedding of a naval shipmaster 
provided MV “Taiko” with a legal status normally not privy to merchant ships. The political 
and military experience with providing a VPD aboard M/V “Taiko” proved the ability and 
utility of the Royal Norwegian Navy, even though the solution has not been explored to the 
fullest, or in a volume required to support the merchant fleet requirements for armed security. 
The Dutch history and experiences as a sovereign state is much longer than Norway’s. Dutch 
history includes participation in the development of the functional state and the state’s 
monopoly of legitimate use of force, all the way back to the conferences in Westphalia 
(Kissinger 2014, 26). The Dutch history and experience with regulations for and employment 
of private armed security, including private militaries on a corporate level is also very long. 
The Netherlands as an emerging state made use of proxy forces in its efforts to obtain 
independence in the sixteenth Century. The proxy force was made up of privateers (Scott-
Smith and Janssen 2014, 55). Privateers may be defined as private armed personnel 
commissioned by the state to fulfill the function of a military, and therefore also enjoy the 
privileges of a regular force. In addition to the state’s own employment of private armed 
personnel during the 8o years of conflict with Spain, the Dutch also have the historic 
experience with the private armed force of the Dutch East-India Company. In the era of the 
Dutch East-India Company, starting in 1602 and lasting until 1799 the company was granted 
monopoly of trade and the right to muster and sustain a private armed force in order to expand 




 Centuries, just short of the Dutch 
constitution of 1815, the Dutch crown allowed for extensive use of private militaries. Private 
armed militaries were contracted for the protection of Dutch trade, and for securing sea lines 
of communication as the Dutch interests ventured to India (Kissinger 2014, 18). The history 
also entails how the company’s private armed forces grew in size and strength, to the point 
                                                             
1 The Royal Norwegian Navy contingent book for OP RECSYR uses the term “TAIKO Vessel Protection 
Detachement” in describing the task, capability and effort by the embedded security detail.  
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where it was capable of defeating the British fleet and chase off the Portuguese (Britannica). 
The Dutch East-India Company was disbanded in 1799 after the company exceeded its initial 
grants by the Dutch Crown. The history and experience with the Dutch East-India Company’s 
right to sustain a private armed force and how that capability evolved into an irregular 
military capability, clearly made a political impact on the Dutch of the time. “The post-
Napoleonic constitution of 1815 codified the state’s claim to the monopoly of violence, and 
since then the state has maintained its primary position as security provider.” (Scott-Smith 
and Janssen 2014, 55). The first Dutch constitution with explicit claims to monopoly on use 
of force, was written in 1815, even though the Dutch ratified the initial concept and norm on 
state monopoly on legitimate use of force in the first half of the 17
th
 century (Kissinger 2014, 
26).  
The private armed force of the Dutch East-India Company differs from that of the modern 
private military security company (PMSC) on some key aspects. “The Dutch East India 
Company has even been referred to as “the first private military company,” although this 
may be overstated.” (Scott-Smith and Janssen 2014, 55). Tagging the private armed force of 
the Dutch Eat-India Company as a private military security company (PMSC), is not an 
overstatement, but an incorrect statement, if 21
st
 Century codification and definitions are 
applied. The private armed force of the Dutch East-India Company took an active part in 
hostilities, and should therefore be defined as a mercenary outfit.  
Compliance and implementation of the prevailing norm for state 
monopoly on legitimate use of force 
State interpretation and implementation of monopoly on legitimate the use of force, 
supplemented by the states’ approach to the concept of national interest is central to 
understanding contemporary decisions in regards to regulation of armed security. As noted 
earlier, the prevailing norm for monopoly on legitimate use of force is under pressure by 
commercial interests and the encouragement of some governments. The pressure is to a large 
extent facilitated by globalization. Globalization has extended the range of national interest 
beyond the boundaries of the state’s own jurisdiction. The commercial global reach of the flag 
state’s merchant fleet had to accounted into the state’s understanding national interest, as in 
the case in the Netherlands (Scott-Smith and Janssen 2014, 58). Commercial actors pressure 
for an almost globally available armed security capability for the protection of ships, goods 
and crew, is why it is necessary to establish a comprehension of the state’s approach to 
monopoly on legitimate use of armed force.  
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In order to compare the interpretation and practice of state monopoly on the legitimate use of 
armed force between Norway and the Netherlands, the theoretical norm that prevailed until 
recent shall be used as a point of reference. As both subjects for this study are established and 
consolidated democracies, there are no identified reports of abuse of armed force by entities 
subordinate to either state. As such, comparison of governmental documents which include 
the states’ interpretations of international regulations and treaties will be the primary tool for 
establishing the interpretation and practice of state monopoly on legitimate use of force.  
The following category of documents is a part of the state’s strategic messaging, and will 
therefore support the comprehension of the two states’ view on legitimate use of force in the 
maritime environment. In the 2014 edition of the Dutch military’s maritime doctrine (Royal 
Netherlands Navy 2014, 67) it was clearly stated that abiding by, and promoting international 
law is central to the national security strategy. The Dutch maritime doctrine references Article 
90 of the Dutch Constitution where compliance to international treaties is included. The 
Dutch Constitution of 1815 did, as identified in outline of the history of the Netherlands, 
codify that the legitimate use of force was a primary function of the state (Scott-Smith and 
Janssen 2014, 55). The Dutch interpretation dating back to that codification was and still is a 
de facto monopoly on legitimate use of (armed) force.    
Norway shares this approach to international treaties, and in part how compliance to 
international treaties is communicated. The current Norwegian military doctrine for maritime 
operations includes an equally worded statement on its strategy. The Norwegian strategy for 
the maritime environment covers a national commitment to, and promotion of a functioning 
international order for operations at sea, governed by the rule of law (Sjøforsvarsstaben 2015, 
16-17). The Norwegian strategy is reaffirmed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ report on 
global threats to national areas of interest (Utenriksdepartementet 2015a, 52). The report 
describes challenges to international trade in general, and for Norwegian national interests 
especially posed by contemporary acts of piracy. Both documents provided background for 
the Norwegian choice of strategy. The specifics of the Norwegian strategy will be covered in 
a later paragraph, but in short, the strategy has three focus areas, where contracting of private 
armed guards is one of them. The conscious choice of strategy was, and still is based on the 
understanding that smaller states’ activities and interests are very vulnerable in the absence of 
unilateral compliance to international regulations and order. This understanding is not unique 
to Norway. The strategy of own compliance and dependency on other flag states to follow 
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due, should be fairly common among states with national interests beyond the physical 
protection of the (flag) state’s own jurisdiction and capabilities.  
The study of military doctrine is relevant for understanding contemporary political ambition 
on use of military force. Both states’ military maritime doctrine describe the state’s merchant 
fleet’s position and role in the national economy, which in both cases are quite formidable. 
Both doctrines’ also reflect the political ambitions for use of force in the maritime 
environment. The most current Dutch doctrine (2014) included and detailed the Vessel 
Protection Details (VPD) concept and mission, as tasked by the government in addition to the 
roles and tasks for conventional Navy warships (The Royal Netherlands Ministry of Defence 
2016, 280). The Royal Norwegian Navy was never tasked to provide embedded armed 
security by the government, as such the doctrinal description of the navy’s role and 
responsibilities in relation to protection of the merchant fleet only detailed the use of warships 
(Sjøforsvarsstaben 2015, 58-59, 71 and 99-100). 
National compliance and promotion of international treaties are a priority and integral to both 
states’ foreign policy. Both states’ also depend on other states’ compliance as they service 
large merchant fleets which operate globally and beyond the state’s own jurisdiction and 
enforcing capability. There are no clear statements pertaining to a de facto or a de jur 
preference in the texts, but the Dutch clearly indicate a preference through its doctrinal review 
and inclusion of the VPD concept, that the interpretation of state monopoly favors a de facto 
approach. The de facto approach is confirmed through practice. Norway on the other hand 
may indicate a preference for private armed security, as the task of embedded armed security 
is kept out of the concepts covered in doctrine, but is included as a focus area in the report 
outlining the state’s strategy for countering acts of piracy. The Norwegian maritime doctrine 
indicates a preference for a de facto monopoly on force, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
report clearly shows an acceptance for a de jur approach.    
Exposure to modern piracy and governing mitigation measures 
In order to compare the two states’ basis for a decision on the use of private armed security, it 
is important to understand the underlying metrics for merchant fleet potential exposure to acts 
of piracy, merged with the metrics for the states’ own ability to provide adequate protection. 
The intent with the following use of metrics is to establish an understanding of whether or not 
the state, with its existing functions and structures would be able to protect its national 
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interests. The results will support further analysis of these metrics may have affected political 
decisions when facing a surge in modern piracy.   
In the 2012 Review of Maritime Transportation, UNCTAD lists Norway as the eight largest 
flag state in the world, with 851 registered ships, and the Netherlands as the 23
rd 
largest with 
576 registered ships (UNCTAD 2012, 41 (Table)). Not all of the vessels included in the 
numbers are operated in a pirate infested or high risk area (HRA). There are no exact 
recordings or register for ships transitioning pirate infested waters available for either of the 
two flag states, but there are estimates. In 2012 the number of HRA transitions for merchant 
ships flying the Dutch flag was estimated to approximately 250-350 (Ginkel, Putten, and 
Molenaar 2013, 13, KVNR 2014, 2, Scott-Smith and Janssen 2014, 59). There are no equal 
estimates for 2012 and Norwegian ships transition, but the numbers of Norwegian flag ships 
sailing through the HRA is estimated to around 1000 on an annual basis for any given year 
(Utenriksdepartementet 2015a, 52, Giske 2011). Given the numbers of transitions through 
pirate infested waters the ratio, being the estimated transitions divided on number of 
registered ships, for the two nations, puts Norway at 1.2 transitions per ship as opposed to 0.6 
transitions per ship for the Netherlands. The transition per ship ratio is very rough, as it entails 
the total number within the flag state’s ship registry, and does not account for ships which 
have multiple transitions versus those that never pass through the HRA. However, the ratio 
provides an indication of which of the two merchant fleets that endure the largest exposure to 
the pirate threat.  
The primary mitigation measures available at the outset of the piracy surge in the Gulf of 
Aden (GoA), was the fleet of conventional warships with embedded marines or Special 
Forces. Both, Norway and the Netherlands have deployed warships in support of the 
international efforts to suppress acts of piracy. In August 2009 Norway deployed a warship as 
part of EU’s Operation Atalanta in support of merchant ship transitions in the Gulf of Aden 
and surrounding waters (Johansen 2010, 7). Patrolling the HRA with large warships was 
costly and did not provide the coverage required to quell pirate activities. In order to share the 
economic burden the European navies operated on a rotational basis.  
By 2012 Norway had changed its legislation in favor of contracting private armed security 
guards onboard ships transitioning the GoA HRA (Pitney Jr. and Levin 2014, 38). The 
Norwegian government never opted for an embedded military solution. Political awareness of 
the following metrics would necessarily have been a part of why an embedded military option 
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was not conceivable. In the Netherlands the employment of private armed security remained 
prohibited. Dutch policy and law only permitted employment of armed security when, and if 
such capability was provided by the Dutch military (Smallengage Lawyers 2015). Utilizing 
elements from the military did not require changes to the legislation. The VPD option was 
therefore both politically and legislatively available at the beginning of the surge in 
contemporary piracy.  
The availability of the military, including knowledge and flexibility to mount VPDs was also 
a key factor. Relevant military forces capable of operating as VPDs were limited. Relevant 
forces between the two flag states amounted to the Dutch Royal Marines and the Norwegian 
Coastal Ranger Command.  The Dutch Royal Marines is a conventional amphibious force of 
approximately 2300 marines (The Royal Netherlands Ministry of Defence 2016), trained and 
capable of operating in smaller teams during combat or combat like situations. The 
Norwegian Costal Ranger Command (Kystjegerkommandoen) is also a conventional 
amphibious force, but with only approximately 90 soldiers (Melgård 2010) and equal in 
capacity. A numeric comparison of the militaries show that the Dutch were in a far better 
position to deliver a military contributed VPD option. Indeed the Dutch could muster 25.5 
Marines per 1 Norwegian Coastal Ranger Command operator. The share numeric comparison 
does not provide the correct picture even though it reveals a large difference in capability. In 
addition to the identified force numbers, the availability in the specific period must be 
considered. At the specific time when the two flag states were seeking a solution to protect 
national interests against the increasing threat of piracy, the NATO operation in Afghanistan 
remained a military focus and was the main force drainage for the majority of the NATO 
members. In 2011 the Norwegian Costal Rangers still maintained a percentagewise large 
contingent in Afghanistan, whereas the Netherlands had withdrawn all of its troops from 
Afghanistan by mid-2010 (Fox 2010). The redeployment from Afghanistan did not free all the 
Dutch Royal Marines as the Marines maintain a military presence in the Dutch protectorates 
in the Caribbean. A further application of the numeric approach, and without accounting for 
any other military commitments, gives the following relevant force to transitioning ship ratio. 
The capability of Norway was 0.09 operators per ship of the estimated 1000 transitions, whilst 
the Dutch would manage to muster 6.5 Marines per ship for its 350 annual transitions. The 
metrics used are based on a 1oo percent availability of the previously reported force numbers, 
and does not account for training rotations or other qualified leave of absence. From this very 
35 
 
rough analysis of numbers it is clear that by 2011 the Dutch had a potential military option, 
whilst Norway did not.  
Even though the Dutch numbers indicate availability of qualified military personnel, the 
material required to operate VPDs were limited (Ginkel, Putten, and Molenaar 2013, 20). 
Lack of appropriate materiel was negatively affecting the efficiency, sustainability and 
flexibility of the VPD option. Independent of the numeric analysis above, both states are 
reported to suffer from a national security deficit specifically related to military capability to 
secure and protect the states maritime interests. In the Netherlands the deficit was identified as 
a lack in capability for global employment (Scott-Smith and Janssen 2014, 57), whilst in 
Norway there the deficit was identified as the imbalance between the states maritime interests 
and the ability to protect these by military means (Sjøforsvarsstaben 2015, 13). The Dutch 
Ministry of Defence produced an estimate on the expected amount of VPDs it would need in 
support of Dutch registered ships for 2012. The 2012 estimate amounted to 175 deployed 
VPDs (Ginkel, Putten, and Molenaar 2013, 20). There were no similar assessments for annual 
requirements for embedded protection for Norwegian registered ships.  
Norwegian governments have been cautious of publicly sharing details on decisions related to 
the employment of force. The Stoltenberg II government which served at the time, was a 
coalition government who’s decisions on use of force have since been publicly criticized 
((NTB) 2019). It has later been revealed that the coalition government strongly disagreed 
internally in most matters related to use of military force (Egeberg 2017, 446-475). The 
combination of an internally disputed operation in Afghanistan, an inadequate volume in force 
and a contemporary Western trend for outsourcing of security operations to PMSCs, probably 
made the outsourcing of armed security for merchant fleets transitions east of Africa an easy 
decision. A bonus of outsourcing was that the decision served the function of an intra-
governmental compromise, mitigating a lack of political will for more military deployments. 
Mitigating a deficit in the states capability through a legislative change in favour of 
contracting private armed security, moving towards a de jur approach on state monopoly on 
legitimate use of force became main stream, and was not unique to Norway (Bailes, 
Schneckener, and Wulf 2007, 26).  
Summarizing the comparison on merchant fleet exposure and initial flag state mitigation 
strategies and options available in the early period of the piracy surge, reveal large differences 
in fleet exposure. On the use of conventional navy warships the two states’ align on capability 
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and approach, whilst the capability to provide merchant fleet embedded protection measures 
differentiates severely. The rough metric analysis revealed a severe deficit in force volume for 
Norway. The revealed deficit was so clear that it must have played a part in shaping the 
decision by Norway to not provide military VPDs, but to build a strategy around the private 
hiring of armed security guards. The following chapters will study national framework and 
contemporary discourses.  
Regulations and framework 
Building on the above identified national exposure and mitigation strategies, this next part 
will go into the specifics of national regulations in the period 2011-2017.  
Norwegian regulations and legal framework  
Norwegian regulations differentiate between the employment of private armed security on 
land, and the employment of private armed security in the maritime environment. The 
employment of armed security for maritime protection is permitted through the Norwegian 
Ship Safety and Security Act (“Skipssikkerhetsloven”) (2007), the Norwegian Firearms and 
Ammunitions Act (“Våpenloven”) (1961), whilst the general employment of private security 
in general is regulated by the Norwegian Security Guard Act (“Vaktvirksomhetsloven”) 
(2001). The employment of private armed security guards is therefore regulated through a 
cluster of legislations, and not through a single Act (Østensen 2014, 6). In 2011, shortly after 
the IMO published its recommendation for flag states on the use of private contracted armed 
security personnel, Norway changed its legislation for employment of private armed security. 
The imposed changes affected both the Norwegian Ship Safety and Security Act and the 
Norwegian Firearms and Ammunitions Act, but had no implications for the Norwegian 
Security Guard Act. This approach ensured that the changes for the employment of private 
armed security only were applicable for merchant ships operating in international waters or 
defined HRAs. Norwegian authorities viewed the legislative changes as minor in scope, and 
decided that the entire process of legislative re-wording and legislative hearing could be 
delegated to the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The amendments to the legislation were 
never subject to a parliamentary debate. The legislative and regulatory endorsement for 
employment of private armed security aboard Norwegian registered ships may therefore be 
viewed as a purely bureaucratic process and not an informed political decision (Berndtsson 
and Østensen 2015, 9). 
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 “The government of Norway gave an influential boost to the acceptance of private 
security with changes to its maritime security and firearms laws that went into force on July 
1, 2011. The Norwegians stressed that the intent of this legislation was not to encourage use 
of private security, but rather to ensure its responsible regulation.” (Pitney Jr. and Levin 
2014, 38)  
The changes to the Norwegian Firearms and Ammunitions Act place Norway among the very 
few states which allow the use of 12,7mm semi-automatic long barrel weapons. The 
permission to acquire a 12,7mm high-power rifle provides the user with a capability for long 
range engagements, and destruction of hardened materials (Oceans Beyond Piracy 2017, 3). 
This change to the Norwegian Firearms and Ammunitions Act challenges the common 
perception of protection against a proximal threat versus the preemptive ability for 
engagement of a potential threat at stand-off distance. The majority of European states set the 
weapons caliber limit at 11,25mm which is caliber intended for semi-automatic pistols (.45 
ACP). Additional changes to the Norwegian Firearms and Ammunitions Act included grants 
for private security guards to acquire fully automatic assault rifles, which typically are explicit 
for law enforcement and military purposes. The updates to the Norwegian Firearms and 
Ammunitions Act are thus very liberal compared to other European countries (Berndtsson and 
Østensen 2015, 14). The Norwegian Firearms and Ammunitions Act is not an easy read and 
require technical knowledge of weapons and munitions. As a consequence, the Norwegian 
Maritime Authority (NMA) has listed specifications for authorized weapons (2011, 6).  
Observing the specifics of the changes to the Norwegian legislation, Pitney and Levine 
comments: 
“On July 1, Norway issued exemptions to its domestic firearms laws, permitting 
shipping companies threatened by piracy to use armed guards on Norwegian-flagged vessels. 
The rule change required shippers to provide documentation of the vetting and training of 
security personnel to the Norwegian Maritime Directorate
2
. They would additionally need to 
apply for a firearm permit from local police, which would authorize carriage of automatic 
weapons up to 7,62 mm, or semi-automatic weapons up to 12,7 mm.” (Pitney Jr. and Levin 
2014, 97).  
The Norwegian Maritime Authority (NMA) is the responsible directorate on matters related to 
employment of private armed security guards aboard Norwegian registered ships (Ginkel, 
                                                             
2 The Norwegian Maritime Directorate is renamed the Norwegian Maritime Authority.  
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Putten, and Molenaar 2013, 24). The responsibilities of the NMA are detailed in the preamble 
to the Norwegian Ship Safety and Security Act, and in the guidance provided by NMA 
(Sjøfartsdirektoratet 2012). At a Naval Coordination and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) 
seminar
3
 held in April 2016 in Norway, NMA as the appointed authority summarized its 
experiences with Norwegian employment of private armed security guards aboard Norwegian 
ships. In the period from July 1
st
 2011 until April 20
th
 2016, there were 2773 reported 
instances of Norwegian flagged vessels utilizing the services of armed security guards while 
transitioning the HRA off the coast of Somalia (Lofthus 2016, 29). The number constitutes 
approximately 25-30 percent of Norwegian ships transitioning through the GoA HRA in the 
reported period. NMA shared experiences on observed compliance with flag state policy and 
regulations for the employment of armed guards, referencing the reporting requirements 
stated in the national regulations.  
Experiences with a de jur approach to employment of armed security guards were that the 
guards fulfill their protective function, but are beyond Norwegian authorities’ oversight and 
inspection ability (Enersen and Fife 2011, 1, Lofthus 2016). Bottom line for the Norwegian 
experience with authority oversight of contracting of private armed security guards was 
summarized by the NMA as “lack of” compliance to regulations and guidance, and limited 
capability for oversight by the appointed directorate. NMA stated that there is a lack of 
reporting from ships on procedures for employing and contracting armed guards. There is a 
lack on declaration of firearms and munition permits obtained by the armed guards, and lastly 
there is a lack of reporting on completed HRA transitions which include embarked armed 
guards. The vetting and reporting of private armed security guards has been adequate in 
identifying companies and operators, but unsatisfactory for qualifications and conduct. 
Vetting of private armed security companies and guards is the responsibility of the ship 
owner, as stated in both the legislation and NMA guidance (Sjøfartsdirektoratet 2012).  
The experiences presented by the NMA are in stark contrast to a statement by Norwegian 
authorities that the legislative changes would ensure the responsible regulation of private 
armed security (Pitney Jr. and Levin 2014, 38). Stating that the change would endure a 
responsible regulation communicate a capability to properly maintain oversight and if 
required investigate wrongful actions by private armed guards in accordance with the national 
legislation and international treaties. However, as clearly expressed by the appointed 
                                                             
3 The candidate participated at the NCAGS event and all information referenced is identifiable through the 
written material that was made available via the Norwegian Navy`s NACAGS office.  
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responsible authority, the perception is that there is a lack of compliance, a lack sanctions for 
non-compliance, and also a lack of capability to investigate incidents. The non-compliance 
option available is to tag unqualified security companies as unwanted on Norwegian ships 
(Lofthus 2016, 32). The above experiences coincide with the claim concerning the reporting 
regime being unfavorable in the eyes of both ship owner and the armed security provider 
(Østensen 2014, 21). The claim is that neither ship captain nor security guard will necessarily 
be interested in reporting incidents to Norwegian authorities, as that potentially may spur 
negative reactions and impact the prospects for future contracts. Negative reporting may even 
result in a change or reversal of the existing liberal regulation.    
In short, in 2012 Norway chose a legislative (de jur) approach to state monopoly on legitimate 
use of force at sea, by permitting employment of private armed security to safe guard certain 
private and commercial interests. The Norwegian legislation limits the employment of private 
armed security to international waters and defined HRAs away from own territorial waters. 
The geographical constraint on employment of private armed guards limits the national 
capacity for maintaining oversight on employment and capability to investigate and prosecute 
wrongful actions. The experience of non-compliance and lack of reporting on vetting, 
employment, and services provided by private armed security guards, along with limited state 
capability for oversight and investigation can only be viewed as an immature attempt of a de 
jur approach on state monopoly on use of force by private actors limited to the maritime 
environment.   
The Dutch regulations and legal framework 
The Dutch legislation both prior to, and during the surge in modern piracy, ensured that the 
Netherlands was among the few European countries that prohibited the use of private armed 
security guards. “This leaves the Netherlands as one of the only countries in Europe to adhere 
to a strict interpretation of the state’s need to keep a monopoly on force.” (Ginkel, Putten, 
and Molenaar 2013, 11). As the Dutch Constitution was written in 1815 there was a need for a 
contemporary policy on how to approach this strict de facto approach.   
An outline of the development on the Dutch policy on protection against contemporary 
piracy, started in 2006 with the issue of the Dutch government’s first comprehensive policy 
for protection against pirate attacks and armed robbery at sea (Zwanenburg 2012, 98-100). 
The challenge with this policy was that it was classified making it generally inaccessible. In 
2008, the Dutch government provided another classified document, which covers the basis for 
the Dutch flag state’s provision of security assistance to Dutch-flagged ships. The Dutch 
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Constitution of 1815 ensured a strict adherence to state monopoly on legitimate use of force. 
The constitutional de facto approach necessitated that the Dutch military would be the only 
legitimate provider of armed security. The chosen military solution would consist of small 
force elements that would be identified as Vessel Protection Detachments (VPD). VPDs 
would embark on Dutch-flagged merchant ships in order to provide armed protection services. 
The part of the 2008 policy document that were released to the Dutch Parliament was the list 
of criteria which the ship owner or ship were required to meet in order to qualify for state 
provided military VPD. The approach for granting VPD support was restrictive and required 
that all criteria’s were met, including the implementation of IMO’s Best Management 
Practice (BMP) (IMO 2011b) (IMO 2011a). Due to the strict policy, a very limited number of 
Dutch registered vessels qualified for VPD protection in the period. The restrictive approach 
raised discontent within the Dutch shipping industry, and were publicly questioned by 
academia (Ginkel, Putten, and Molenaar 2013, 9).  
Not all Dutch-flagged ships are registered in the Netherlands, this added to the difficulties of 
qualifying for a VPD. Ships registered in the island state of Curacao were also flying the 
Dutch flag, but were not entitled to state provide protection when transitioning the GoA HRA. 
“Consequently, when speaking of a ship flying the flag of the Netherlands, this can be either a 
ship registered in the Netherlands or a ship registered in Curacao.” (Zwanenburg 2012, 99) 
For the purpose of simplicity, this study will only consider ships registered in the Netherlands 
(proper), and therefore eligible for Dutch flag state provided embedded armed security.  
An additional regulation in 2011, and the subsequent employment of VPDs, were based on 
two existing governing documents, one national – the Dutch Constitution, and one 
intergovernmental – the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) convention (Ginkel, Putten, and 
Molenaar 2013, 13-14, Scott-Smith and Janssen 2014, 60). The 2011 regulation stated that: 
“Indeed, Article 97(1) provides that "[t]here shall be armed forces for the defense and 
protection of the interests of the Kingdom, and in order to maintain and promote the 
international legal order" (Zwanenburg 2012, 104). As a supplement to the two baseline 
documents, the Dutch penal code acknowledged the use of force as legitimate for self-
defense, including for the protection of goods. The Dutch inclusion of goods under the 
inherent right to self-defense is unique in Europe (Zwanenburg 2012, 106). Like with 
Norway, the Dutch legislation for employment of armed security is complex and regulations 
are the product of several legislative works. In addition to the Dutch Constitution, which 
dictates a de facto monopoly of legitimate use of force, the Dutch Weapons and Munitions 
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Law (WML) prohibits the use of firearms by private security guards within the Netherlands, 
but has exemptions for temporary weapon permits acquired for self-defense aboard Dutch 
ships (Scott-Smith and Janssen 2014, 55).    
The Dutch decision to employ military VPDs in accordance with the existing de jur approach 
in the Dutch Constitution and other regulations provided a transparent solution, as VPDs are 
drafted from the state’s regular forces. The decided on solution encompassed elements from 
an existing military force subordinate to the national military command and control apparatus, 
an established military investigative and prosecution mechanism, and existing political 
oversight (e.g. budgeting). The VPD solution was therefore also in full compliance with IMO 
requirements for oversight and control. VPDs as a de facto function of the state was 
privileged to the state’s rights (and obligations) to interdict, detain and arrest pirates in 
accordance with UNCLOS (Ginkel, Putten, and Molenaar 2013, 26). As such the VPD option 
offered a more flexible approach as the available tool set was more comprehensive than that 
of a private armed security guard. 
Despite the legislative anchoring of the VPD option, Dutch authorities decided to seek advice 
through several research studies on the subject of embedded armed security. The studies on 
embarked armed security will be covered in the following paragraphs as these studies became 
part of the contemporary discourses on state approach to monopoly on legitimate use of force.  
Discourses on state monopoly on legitimate use of force 
Contemporary discourses provide a means to understand which perceptions that shapes the 
evolution of the state of affairs for a specific subject. Legislation and opinion may change as 
new information is made available either through internal or external input. The modern surge 
in piracy and the inherent increase in risk that specific phenomenon imposed on international 
trade routes, functioned as an external input to perception and the evolution of state of affairs 
for security at sea in general and the state of affairs for management of legitimate use of force 
especially.   
Norwegian discourses on legitimate use of force against acts of piracy 
The contemporary debate on the subject of armed security employed for protection of 
Norwegian flagged vessels was limited. In 2010-2011 there was some public debate on the 
subject, but a major debate never materialized. This was likely due to how changes to 
legislation was delegated to the Ministry of Trade and Industry and primarily managed the 
bureaucratic level. The 2011 changes to legislation succeeded a legislative hearing which 
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officially involved potential communities of concern. The legislative hearing only drew a few 
responses (Heldre 2011, Enersen and Fife 2011, Vervik and Prytz 2013, Meland 2011)
4
. 
Respondents primarily fit into one of two categories, namely bureaucratic responses from 
governmental bodies, ministries and directorates, and user responses from ship owners 
associations and maritime labor unions. The responses were for the most general in nature, 
stating that legislative provision for contracting of private armed security would challenge the 
state’s legitimate monopoly on the use of force. The general and repeated opinion was that 
armed security should remain as a function of the state. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(Utenriksdepartementet) cautioned against armed guards in general and urged for all other 
means to be explored prior to the use of armed force. However, the Norwegian Maritime 
Authority (NMA) emphasized the effect of embarked armed security and embraced the armed 
security option, as none of the ships protected by armed guards had been hijacked (Heldre 
2011, 1). There was a general call for an oversight mechanism for private use of force at sea.  
The call for oversight was accompanied by latent communicated expectations of compliance 
by all involved parties. All available responses concluded in a positive way for a legislative 
change in favor of a private armed security option. None of the responses were openly 
positive, but the conclusions were formulated in a way that seemingly provided acceptance. 
The general lack of negative feedback to private armed guards is likely due to the choice of 
wording in the legislative hearing. The hearing requested “principle views on the employment 
of armed security guards” (Heldre 2011),  implying private armed security guards, but not 
clearly differentiating between private and military guards. The hearing request also invited 
input on alternatives solutions. The only respondent that brought up embedding a military 
capability was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented the 
VPD option as an alternative of necessity, indicating that the VPD option was not an eligible 
option (Enersen and Fife 2011, 3). Prior to providing a response, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs met with representatives of the Norwegian Shipowners’ Association 
(Rederiforbundet) who briefed on the associations’ work on vetting and contracting private 
armed security, along with a presentation of what seemingly was the International Code of 
Conduct (ICoC) (Enersen and Fife 2011, 4 and 14).  
There was limited open political debate on the legislative changes in favor of a private armed 
security option. There was also limited debate in the media, other than a news chronical by 
                                                             
4 The public record of responses and comments to the official hearing on armed security on board Norwegian 
registered ships display a very limited interest in the topic.  
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Sosialistisk Venstreparti (SV) (Holmelid 2011). The chronical reaffirmed SV’s general 
opposition for employment of armed force. A statement in the chronical indicated that it was a 
political decision, rather than an increase in acts of piracy that bolstered the requirement for 
additional countermeasures (Holmelid 2011). The 2011 spring edition of MARLOGG, a  
Norwegian shipping journal, presented a survey on maritime security (Brubakk and Jørgensen 
2011, 2). The survey was undertaken by the Maritime Officers’ Association 
(Sjøoffisersforbundet) and showed that 90 percent of the respondents, all Norwegian mariners 
wanted armed security on board as an addition to other physical countermeasures. The 
majority had a preference for military VPDs, but understood the existing challenge of 
available and qualified military capabilities. The survey in MARLOGG 2/2011 is the only 
identifiable record in which the Norwegian maritime industry discusses a military VPD 
option.  
As identified in chapter 1 on the paragraph on sources, the Norwegian academia’s 
participation in the debate on a potential shift in the states management model of monopoly 
on legitimate use of force was limited to a few individuals and papers, of which none were at 
the request or initiative of Norwegian authorities.  
A 2016 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs report on “Global security challenges in 
Norway’s foreign policy” addressed the issue of contemporary acts of piracy and how that 
threat potentially impacted and increased risk levels for the merchant fleet 
(Utenriksdepartementet 2015a)
5
. The report also described the proliferation and fluctuation in 
pirate tactics and geography. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs complimented the Norwegian 
counter-piracy strategy, which followed three separate, but complementary focus areas. The 
focus areas were the continued private contracting of private armed security guards,  
participation with military capabilities in multinational counter-piracy operations – primarily 
warships, Special Forces and maritime patrol aircrafts (MPAs), and thirdly financial 
contributions to regional efforts like the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia 
(CGPCS) (Utenriksdepartementet 2015a, 23-25 and 51-53). The report offers little in the form 
critical review including concerns of the decided counter-piracy efforts in general and for the 
use of private armed security especially. The uncritical view on the existing strategy eludes 
any changes including reviewing options for embarked armed security.  
Concluding on the Norwegian debate and discourse on a national strategy for countering 
contemporary acts of piracy, it is notable that the debate has been limited. The limited debate 
                                                             
5 Note that the English version is an abstract of the 66 pages in Norwegian.  
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is partly due to the bureaucratic, rather than political management of legislative changes and a 
changed policy on state monopoly on use legitimate use of force. The suggested changes to 
legislation and wording in the legislative hearing documents may unconsciously have steered 
inputs towards a positive response on a de jur management on monopoly on use of armed 
force. In the hearing response by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs it is revealed that the 
legislative change was initiated at the request of the Norwegian Shipowners’ Association. 
Academic advice on changes to state monopoly on legitimate use of force was never 
specifically requested as part of the process. Communication of the changes to national 
legislation and policy was very scarce. The information provided by NMA on lack of 
compliance and oversight was given in a closed forum and is therefore unknown to the 
general public, academia and other communities of interest. Norway had no real open debate 
on the changes made, and there has been no follow-up debate on the level of compliance or 
effects of the changed legislation and policy. The change in Norwegian legislation and policy 
on state monopoly on legitimate use of force was in response to the initiative by the 
Norwegian Shipowners’ Association. The changes show that the principles for state 
monopoly on legitimate use of force that had prevailed up until the initiative was formalized 
were set aside in favour of the shipping industry’s interests and in the interest of international 
trade. The perceptions that inform the texts in the Norwegian discourse are pro-de facto, 
whilst the conclusions are lenient towards de jur. The practice is a change for a de jur 
approach, thus limited to the maritime environment.   
Dutch discourses on legitimate use of force against acts of piracy 
The contemporary debate and discourses in the Netherlands were very different form that in 
Norway. The debate on armed security aboard Dutch flagged ships was well documented and 
contextualized by academia. The contemporary debate in the Netherlands on the use of force 
against pirates was shaped by the constitutional requirement of maintaining a de facto state 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force. A summary of the Dutch debate on the subject states 
that:  
“Between 2007 and 2011 the two AIV reports and the de Wijkerslooth Committee had 
opened up the political debate on the use of PMSCs. The general wish of the government, 
Parliament, and the armed forces was to maintain as far as possible the monopoly of 
violence.” (Scott-Smith and Janssen 2014, 62).  
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The de Wijkerslooth Committee refers to the government appointed Advisory Committee on 
Armed Private Security against Piracy, in 2011 (Ginkel, Putten, and Molenaar 2013, 14), 
which will be covered in-depth later.    
In a 2007 report by the Dutch Advisory Council for International Issues (AIV), it was stated 
that the employment of private armed security would entail an accountability gap as their 
legal status was unclear. The Dutch state would therefore become liable for actions by private 
armed security guards (Scott-Smith and Janssen 2014, 56). At the outset of the surge in 
piracy, the Dutch ship owners’ association (KVNR) requested that the flag state provide 
protection without specifying a preferred solution. The initial response to the KVNR request 
was limited to protective escort by naval warships, as described earlier. Escort by naval 
warships rested on two factors. The factors were deployment of Dutch warships to the HRA, 
and that the warship was in proximity of the requesting merchant ship.   
After the hijacking of “M/V Marathon” in 2009, both the Dutch Parliament and KVNR 
pushed for embedded state provided armed security guards. The pressure for a change in 
policy led to a tasking of the Dutch Ministry of Defense to examine a military option. The 
2009 study on embedded military protection details concluded that the employment of VPDs 
was not without risk, and there would be legal and operational limitations for the VPD option. 
Based on the research the government stuck to its existing policy of escort by naval warships. 
Pirate activity and the risk for Dutch ships transitioning the GoA HRA increased, as did the 
pressure for a change in Dutch policy. Still under pressure, the Dutch government requested a 
new study of viable measures for countering acts of piracy, including employment of military 
VPDs. This time the task was passed to AIV. The task did not specify a study on private 
armed security, but this was included at AIV’s own initiative.  
The report which was completed at the end of 2010, presented a decline in transitions of the 
GoA HRA by Dutch ships. Analysis of the decline in transitions pointed in part to acts of 
piracy, but considered the main reason to be a negative trend in international trade. The AIV 
report acknowledged that piracy was affecting the national economy and should therefore be 
considered a matter of national security (Scott-Smith and Janssen 2014, 58). The conclusion 
on decline in merchant fleet transitions did not fare well with KVNR. KVNR responded to the 
AIV report and claimed the decline was a direct consequence to acts of piracy. As part of the 
research AIV conducted interviews of representatives from the shipping industry. Some of 
those interviewed stated that if the government did not change its policy, they would illegally 
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contract private armed security guards. AIV therefore included a recommendation for a 
change to policy and a mechanism for certifying and regulating employment of private armed 
security. The AIV pointed out that this approach would challenge the existing state of affairs 
for state monopoly on legitimate use of force.  
The AIV’s recommendation that piracy should be acknowledged as a national security 
challenge prompted a demand, rather than just a request for military VPDs, and shortly 
thereafter there were rumors of a growing practice of contracting private armed security 
aboard Dutch ships. By late 2010, the Parliament motioned the government to consider the 
provision of military VPDs, should a naval warship escort be unavailable. Within the time 
span of four months the military VPD option was amended, and by early 2011 the first 
military VPDs were deployed to the Gulf of Aden (GoA). The financing of military VPDs 
was to be covered by the ship owners like any other countermeasure, this decision effectively 
commercialized military protection (Chapsos 2013). The military VPD solution was 
supported by the majority of Parliament (Zwanenburg 2012, 100).  
As the AIV report recommended a change to the existing strict approach to private armed 
security, the Dutch government requested a specific study on legal aspects for private armed 
security. This time the task was given to a special committee on private armed security for 
countering acts of piracy (Ginkel, Putten, and Molenaar 2013, 14).  
“The central question from the government was to the point: “What is your advice in 
relation to the eventual undermining of the monopoly of violence with the deployment of 
armed private security guards, in order to provide an adequate protection of Dutch-registered 
vessels against piracy?” (Scott-Smith and Janssen 2014, 61).  
The specific wording in the task to the de Wijkerslooth Committee implied an overt 
skepticism towards a change in state monopoly on legitimate use of force. The de 
Wijkerslooth Committee report responded accordingly by “delving into Max Weber and 
claiming that private citizens may use violence if it is both sanctioned by and in the interests 
of the state.” (Scott-Smith and Janssen 2014, 61-62). The committee also challenges the 
AIV’s recommendation for acknowledging piracy as a threat to national interests. The report 
pointed out that there was little coverage to claims of piracy being a challenge to the Dutch 
state’s ability to sufficiently fulfill its obligations to protect national interests, including 
merchant ships. The committee report aligns closely to the theoretical ideal on state monopoly 
on legitimate use of force. After having consulted with AIV, the committee chose not to 
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investigate details on the illicit practice of contracting private armed security guards. The de 
Wijkerslooth Committee report stated that: “…state action was essential to prevent “its 
citizens from resorting to the use of weapons or to individuals or companies that are able to 
offer the required protection, thereby leading to a possible escalation of violence and 
certainly losing democratic checks on the use of weapons.”” (Scott-Smith and Janssen 2014, 
61). As a recommendation to the above statement the report introduced the option of 
insourcing private armed security companies. Insourcing would provide private armed 
security operators with a temporary military (legal) status allowing the government to 
exercise a de facto control on the use of arms. The Dutch government did not see the 
insourcing of private armed security operators as appropriate, and stated that the provision of 
military VPDs would be a substantial enough change to existing policy. Triggered by the 
release of the committee report, the following response by the government, and the shortness 
of available military VPDs, ship owners publically voiced their intent to contract and employ 
private armed guards. The ship owners argued that protecting employees was more important 
than complying with a Dutch law that was seemingly inadequate in dealing with modern acts 
of piracy (Scott-Smith and Janssen 2014, 62). 
The Dutch debate on the possibility to contract private armed security guards changed around 
2013. The change came when Cliengendael, an independent research institute challenged the 
Dutch government’s ability to adequately protect its merchant fleet (Ginkel, Putten, and 
Molenaar 2013). The Clingendael-report pointed to the lack of available military VPDs, and 
critiqued Dutch authorities for pursuing a too strict approach to monopoly on legitimate use of 
force. The report argued that the strict approach of prohibiting use of private armed security 
guards could lead to an illicit practice of contracting private armed guards (Scott-Smith and 
Janssen 2014, 63, Ginkel, Putten, and Molenaar 2013, 34). The critique incited the 
engagement of a Dutch based private military security company (PMSC) into the debate. The 
Dutch PMSC had a solid record in regards to branch standard compliance. Despite of the 
PMSC’s support for a change in the Dutch policy, employees of the company, mostly Dutch 
ex-military, expressed support for the authoritie’s current position. The entry of PMSCs into 
the debate served as a boost for those lobbying for a de jur solution on private armed security. 
The pro-private armed security lobby consisted of the Royal Society for Merchant Captains 
(KVKK), KNVR and some private security companies.  
KVKK entry into the pro-private armed security lobby was a turning point, as KVKK had 
been very supportive of the de facto state monopoly on legitimate use of armed force, and the 
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VPD option (Scott-Smith and Janssen 2014, 66). In 2013 requests for VPDs surpassed the 
capability of the military. The Ministry of Defense was forced to inform the Dutch Parliament 
and included a recommendation for a new study of the private armed security option. By the 
end of 2015 the Dutch government issued a statement to Parliament on the continued support 
for the de facto approach, but indicating a will for exempts to policy should VPDs not be 
available.  A draft for a new Protection of Merchant Shipping Act
6
 was forwarded to 
Parliament in early 2017. The draft considered the low availability of military VPDs, and 
opted for the employment of private armed security in certain instances (Mevis and Eckhardt 
2019).  
The conclusion on the debate in the Netherlands is that it did engage across the political 
landscape, the military, academia, the shipping industry, and the private security community. 
Leading arguments showed how strongly state monopoly on legitimate use of force was 
rooted in the Dutch society and political environment. The inclusion of early theory on state 
in order to argue a de facto state monopoly on use of force, points to a high expectation on 
compliance and accountability. From approximately 2012 and onwards the two distinct 
leading arguments in the debate were: the strict de facto view on state monopoly on legitimate 
use of force, and the resourcing including financing, high cost and availability of military 
VPDs versus that of a private armed guards. High cost and low availability for military VPDs 
was one of the most prominent pro-private armed security arguments. The argument was 
strengthened by the unveiling of an existing illicit practice of contracting private armed 
guards. Additionally there was a third latent argument in the discourse. That argument was 
fear.  
Fear was used as a latent rhetorical aid to promote and underline other arguments, and to gain 
public sympathy for the primary argument. Fear of piracy attacks, fear of high VPD costs 
negatively affecting the Dutch competition in the international market. Fear is arguably what 
                                                             
6
 The following information is outside the timeframe scoped for this thesis. In the first quarter of 2018 the Dutch 
House of Representatives processed the Merchant Navy Protection Act-proposal. The purpose of the proposal 
was to allow for private contracting of private armed security guards in the event of unavailability of military 
VPDs. The proposed Act restricts the contracting of private armed security to the waters off the coast of Somalia 
(KVNR 2018). The Merchant Navy Protection Act was not amended. In 2019 a former initiative – The Merchant 
Shipping Protection Act was amended changing the Dutch policy towards  acceptance of private contracting of 




lifted the contemporary threat of piracy up to the level of national interest. Fear as a latent 
argument observed in Dutch debate was not recognizable in the Norwegian debate. In Norway 
the debate was never as public, and therefore there was no need for rhetorical aids in support 
of main arguments. The national debate on use of private armed security in the Netherlands, 
unarguably challenged the perception of the state’s role as the only provider of security. The 
discourse was heavily rooted in the century’s long perception that the state is the only 
legitimate provider of armed security. The prevailing perception is clearly presented in text 
and practice, by all parties. The differences in the communications are the uses of rhetorical 
aids. However, the perception of the state being the only provider remained prevalent in the 
debate.     
Summary of the analysis on the differences in approach to state 
monopoly on legitimate use of force in countering contemporary 
acts of piracy 
In the introduction in chapter 1, there is a figure which displays differences for flag state 
policy on legitimate use of force, and acceptance for private use of force in countering 
modern piracy (Ginkel, Putten, and Molenaar 2013). The below figure expands the original 
version by displaying the gap that the research question seeks to answer: which factors and 
leading arguments may explain the observed divide in policy and regulations between the two 





The comparison of the two subjects has revealed that there was a major difference as to how 
armed security measures against acts of piracy was managed at government level. The 
difference relates to whether it was a political or bureaucratic led process and decision. As 
such this is likely core to the above visualized difference. In both states the processes of 
reviewing existing policy and legislation was initiated through external initiatives by the 
shipping industry. In Norway the process within the government apparatus was 
bureaucratically driven under the lead of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The process was 
to a large extent contained within a small community, with very limited public debate and 
insight to the changes in state monopoly on legitimate use of force. In the Netherlands, the 
process was more politically driven within the government apparatus, with a public debate 
which included input from across the political landscape, academia, shipping industry and the 
private armed security community. Evolution of Dutch policy was based on informed 
decisions through a reasonable use of academic support, an approach not observed in the case 
of Norway. History and the states’ differences in experience in employment and regulation of 
private use of armed force have clearly made an impact on contemporary perceptions and 
practices. In the Netherlands the negative experiences related to former state regulations of, 
and actions by the mercenary army of the Dutch East-India Company, thus not comparable to 
contemporary PMSCs, was included in the arguments for maintaining the strict interpretation 
and practice of a de facto state monopoly on use of force. The perceptions of need for strict 
control with armed force prevailed and continued as foundation for the Dutch state’s practice.  
The analysis of potential exposure to acts of piracy weighed against eligible and available 
options for countering modern piracy within the existing functions of the state showed that 
whilst the Netherlands, through its Royal Marines had a fairly suited option, Norway did not. 
This awareness has likely shaped the policy and practice. In the Netherlands this may have 
reinforced the current discourse positively, whilst in Norway this perception was never 
communicated in an open debate. It is therefore only possible to assume that the metric 
argument was used internally in shaping a new policy and practice.  
A last key finding is the political ownership to treaties on the abolishment of private use of 
armed force. There difference between Norway and the Netherlands in respect to this point is 
quite large. The functional state’s development and implementation of independent security- 
and foreign policy, and international interactions in which those policies were tested, 
separates the Netherlands and Norway with roughly 250 years. That difference incorporates 
the direct and privileged access to the evolution of what became the prevailing norm for state 
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monopoly on use of force by the Netherlands, and not by Norway. This key finding may be a 
central cause to the difference in contemporary management of the processes and especially 
which level of government that was in lead – the political level or the bureaucratic level. As 
already identified, the Dutch made an informed decision based on several sources from across 
society, whereas in Norway the change was bureaucratically driven and seemingly short of a 
wider politically informed decision. The Norwegian changes placed Norway among the most 
liberal states on use of private armed security aboard its’ merchant fleet. The very liberal 
approach combined with the shortcomings in the capability to check levels of regulatory 
compliance, points towards a political system swayed by the shipping industry. It was the 
considerations for the shipping industry that prevailed in the current change towards a de jur 
approach in the Norwegian policy for employment of legitimate use of force in the maritime 
environment. The changes to the Norwegian policy deviated from the normal principles on 
which Norway generally approaches legitimate use of force, as such a further change towards 
a wider de jur approach is not expected.  
4: Conclusion 
Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart (Ghani and Lockhart 2008, 5) observed that the first 
impulse is to use force in order to resolve a new problem. Even though it is a first impulse it 
may not be the first countermeasure. However, in relation to countering contemporary acts of 
piracy, the use of force was introduced very early and thus summarizes the findings in 
general. This first impulse on need for armed security is what initiated the process for policy 
and legislative change. The process in both states took years before reaching a decision on 
whether to changes policy or not. In the meantime that first impulse also manifested itself 
through the illicit private contracting of private armed security by ship owners in both 
Norway and the Netherlands. Specific findings show that while the Dutch government chose 
to utilize a tool from its’ existing toolbox, the Norwegian government ended up with opting 
for a new tool. Sir Rupert Smith’s description on the king’s dilemma still proves valid as 
governing bodies struggle to maintain a relevant and available force as required. This is due to 
the financial burden and the absence of an immediate threat to the state itself. As threats to 
national interests are numerous, exposure and imminence is dynamic, it is the government’s 
task to prioritize importance of both threats and countermeasures. In light of how 
contemporary piracy has evolved and proliferated, the immanency for a solution is no longer a 
pressing matter, and as such the ad hoc initiatives and solutions should be re-evaluated.   
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Contemporary political choices are the result of the state’s political currency which is based 
on state history, state regulatory experience and state ownership to international treaties. Even 
though the Dutch government decided to continue its strict de facto approach to the state 
monopoly on use of force and task it’s military to provide the necessary capabilities, the 
decided upon solution has in part commercialized armed security. The near-
commercialization effort was prompted by pushing the cost coverage responsibility for the 
service of armed security onto the ship owner. The cost for military armed security came on 
top of normal taxation. As such the solution is governed by the economic ability of the ship 
owner. In Norway this was never an issue, as the military was never tasked. However, the 
contracting of private armed security by the ship owner is also governed by his/her economic 
ability, and as such the Dutch solution levels the playing field between merchant fleets 
subordinate to either a de jur or a de facto solution for state monopoly on legitimate use of 
force.   
To answer the research question in short, the decided upon solutions are the result of process. 
While the process in the Netherlands was very open, the process in Norway was closed. The 
processes were also informed differently. In the Netherlands the debate and changed practice 
did not have to consider a force deficiency at the same level Norway seemingly was forced to. 
This ensured that the debate in the Netherlands could focus on the level and principles of use 
of armed security, whilst Norway was driven towards an alternative for practical reasons, 
which may explain the lack of an open debate.  
As the thesis shows, oversight mechanisms for private armed security guards is an issue that 
needs to be more thoroughly addressed by states that practice a de jur monopoly on legitimate 
use of force. The need is for more robustness within that part of the state appointed to oversee 
or supervise vetting, certification, permits and contracting of private armed security. In 
addition there is a need to review state requirements to private armed security guards, which 
can replace or reduce the burden of cumbersome investigative responsibilities. The 
Norwegian regulations for private armed security should include requirements for better 
recording of incidents where firearms are employed. Available technology used among 
military and law enforcement agencies for documentation of own actions should be a flag 
state requirement for private armed guards. Already available technologies include helmet, 
body or weapons camera, communications recordings (e.g. sealed voice recorder like on 
airplanes), state provided sealed ammunition which is traceable by the make, caliber and type 
(e.g. LOT-numbers), and individual geographical tracking devises (e.g. blue-force-tracker) for 
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movement visualization and recording during skirmishes. The use of body camera has been 
the benefit of both reducing excessive use of force, while documenting the scenario including 
perpetrator actions (Jonsson 2019). On the subject of state provided ammunition, there are 
ammunition types that are engineered for operations in a vulnerable environment like oil or 
gas tankers. The projectile will fragment on impact and therefore reduce any damage to ship 
and goods. This specific type of ammunition is often only available to government agencies. 
If the flag state assumes responsibility for ammunition logistics for private armed guards, this 
type of damage reducing munitions could be made available. A requirement to use the above 
technologies by private armed security guards will increase the oversight ability, ease 
investigations efforts, document acts of piracy, and increase the level of transparency for 
embedded armed security.     
The contemporary studies and views referenced in chapter 2 arguably follow an extrapolated 
curve which started at the peak in application of the prevailing norm for state monopoly on 
legitimate use of force. As such none of the above studies have looked at a counter-pendulum 
move. If a shift of the norm goes too far, will there be a repercussion that seeks to integrate 
the security industry into the states own security structure? History has shown that this is a 
feasible action. Should the counter-pendulum move require that the state once again needs to 
insource all aspects of legitimate use of force, and apply a strict (re)definition of monopoly on 
use of force, PMSCs could be included into the states security structure to be made legal 
(Smith 2005, 7). Integration into the state’s own security structure is what happened with the 
private navy of the British East-India Company as it was absorbed into the Royal Navy 
(Pitney Jr. and Levin 2014, Introduction x).  
This thesis provides knowledge on some aspects of Dutch and Norwegian contemporary 
approaches to state monopoly on legitimate use of force for countering modern acts of piracy 
in the maritime environment. As the work on this thesis progressed, related questions were 
revealed. The most relevant questions being: 
 Will there be a reversal of legislations followed by the abolishment of private use of 
force in the maritime environment?  
 Will the NATO members strengthen their budgets and include embedded protection of 
the merchant fleet to its military tasks and replace private armed security?  
54 
 
 Will outsourcing of tasks short of war continue and proliferate into other domains, 
based on the experiences from contracting of private armed security in the maritime 
environment?   
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